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1.1. The point of view and methods of the thesis 
 
In July 2020, the prestigious Hugo Awards for that year were awarded. The 1945 Retroactive 
Hugo Award for Best Series was awarded to The Cthulhu Mythos by H.P. Lovecraft, August 
Derleth and others, which caused controversy (on the awards, see The Hugo Awards, 2020a; 
on the controversy, see responses to @TheHugoAwards on Twitter, 2020b and Ball, 2020). 
The primary cause of the controversy sparked by this posthumous award to Lovecraft was the 
American horror writer’s well-known racist views (e.g. Sederholm and Weinstock 2016, 25-
28; Simmons 2013, 15-16). Few would dispute, however, Lovecraft’s influence on modern 
popular culture and horror fiction: concepts and imagery from his works have pervaded 
popular culture, from horror and science fiction literature and movies to music (Jones 2013, 
227-230; Loponen 2019, 18). A pulp magazine writer who lived most of his life in poverty 
and relative obscurity (Joshi 2001, 168; Sederholm and Weinstock 2016, 1), Lovecraft has, in 
the 2000s, been accepted as a part of the American literary canon (Hantke 2013, 137); the 
influence of his works cannot be denied. This ongoing influence that his fiction exerts means 
that, even though Lovecraft’s works have received much academic attention in the 2000s, the 
work of analyzing his writings critically is by no means over. 
This thesis analyzes the construction of humanity in two of Lovecraft’s novellas, The 
Shadow over Innsmouth and At the Mountains of Madness. Many critics have considered 
Lovecraft an anti-humanist and even misanthropic writer, whose stories express a worldview 
of “mechanistic materialism” where human beings are absolutely meaningless (Sederholm 
and Weinstock 2016, 4-6; Joshi 2001, 245). However, I hope to show in this thesis that the 
image of humanity constructed in these two works is more complex than that. Central to my 
thesis are the concepts of Enlightenment humanism and Enlightenment humanity, drawn from 
posthumanist and postcolonial theory. Enlightenment humanism exalts its subject, the 
Enlightenment human or “Man,” who is defined by rationality, intelligence and individuality, 
and frequently by science. I intend to show that, while the analyzed texts may indeed take a 
dismissive outlook on humanity in general, they simultaneously construct a version of 
valorized Enlightenment humanity. 
Even though it would be illuminating to study the construction of humanity in 




of two works, At the Mountains of Madness (1936) and The Shadow over Innsmouth (1936) 
(abbreviated MM and SoI, respectively). Due to the fact that I am only analyzing two texts, 
one should not take the analysis as representative of all of Lovecraft’s fiction: there may be 
works that express a different conception of humanity from these ones. However, limiting the 
number of analyzed works allows for detailed and in-depth analysis. I chose these texts 
mostly because they demonstrate different aspects of Enlightenment humanity. The two 
stories are also, according to S. T. Joshi, among Lovecraft’s strongest works (Joshi 2001, 
332). Both texts were written in 1931 (ibid., 300, 305), although published in 1936: thus, they 
can also be seen to provide a snapshot of Lovecraft’s writing at a certain time.   
In terms of genre, these works straddle horror and science fiction. Although 
Lovecraft’s fiction in general is most commonly referred to as horror or weird fiction 
(Sederholm and Weinstock 2016, 1), most of his works post-Call of Cthulhu (written 1926: 
see Joshi 2001, 242) can also be defined as science fiction due to the fact that the 
“supernatural” events of the stories are eventually given a scientific justification (Joshi 2001, 
300). While my analysis does not focus on the genre of the works per se, occasionally brief 
considerations of genre are relevant for the analysis.  
Full synopses of each text will be provided at the start of the corresponding analysis 
chapter. Here I will provide shorter synopses of the texts. The Shadow over Innsmouth is 
about a fictitious New England town called Innsmouth, whose population appears to suffer 
from a disfiguring hereditary disease. Upon investigation, the narrator of the story discovers 
that the people of Innsmouth are the offspring of unions between humans and monstrous 
nonhuman creatures called Deep Ones, who live deep in the sea. The “disease” is in fact a 
physical transformation, where the hybrid descendants of humans and Deep Ones become 
more and more like the Deep Ones as they age. At the end of the story, the narrator finds out 
that he himself is descended from the people of Innsmouth, and to his horror, he undergoes 
the same transformation as the people of Innsmouth. 
At the Mountains of Madness takes place in the Antarctic, where a scientific 
expedition discovers mysterious fossils previously unknown to science. Investigating the 
mountain range that gives the story its name, the narrator of the story finds an ancient, 
deserved city. He discovers that this city was once populated by intelligent alien creatures that 
he calls “Old Ones” and that the “fossils” are in fact hibernating Old Ones. He further finds 
out that the Old Ones once created all life on earth, including humankind. This revelation, and 
the narrator’s insight that the Old Ones are in many ways much like humans, challenges the 




Analysis of the conception of humanity in Lovecraft’s works often must account for 
racism: numerous critics have noted that Lovecraft’s racism is not only a matter of the 
author’s personal opinions, but that racism is very much present in his literary work. To take 
but one example, China Miéville has said that Lovecraft’s antihumanism is “predicated on 
murderous race hatred […] I don’t think the racism can be divorced from [Lovecraft’s] 
writing at all, nor should it be” (Weinstock 2016, 241). This observation prompted me to 
include this point of view in my analysis of how humanity is constructed in these works: who, 
in these texts, is included in (full) humanity, and who is excluded from it? Posthumanist and 
postcolonial critics of Enlightenment humanism note that Enlightenment humanism often, 
despite its claims to egalitarianism and universality, in practice excludes e.g. people of color, 
women, people with disabilities, and various minorities from full humanity (Gandhi 2019, 
Nayar 2013). Therefore, the examination of racism in the texts also ties in with the analysis of 
Enlightenment humanity. I intend to show that the conception of humanity constructed in 
these texts is a hierarchical and exclusive one: it sets some humans above others and even 
excludes some human beings from full humanity, particularly in terms of race. 
Although I use some posthumanist theory in my thesis, it should be noted that this 
work is not posthumanist as such. This work does not participate in the posthumanist 
imagining of a new, more inclusive conception of humanity, of humans as biological-
technological assemblies that contain nonhuman elements within themselves (Nayar 2013), or 
the articulation of a new ethical framework based on this new idea of humanity (Wolfe 1995, 
33). I merely have found the philosophical foundations of posthumanism a useful theoretical 
starting point from which to embark on my analysis.  
As the method of my analysis, I will employ close reading from two complementary 
points of view. Firstly, I will analyze the human characters (primarily the narrators) of the 
stories, with a particular focus on their epistemology, i.e. how they acquire and verify 
information. This is because a certain method of knowing things is constitutive of the 
Enlightenment human, as I will explain in more detail later. In addition to this, I will analyze 
the monstrous beings that the narrators encounter in the texts. This is because the monsters in 
these texts offer very useful insight on the nature of humanity that is constructed in the texts. I 
will explain the reasons for this in more detail in section 1.3., but to put it very briefly, 
monsters in literature and culture often function as devices that reveal the border between 
human and non-human. Thus, studying monsters helps us understand the construction of 




Literary texts play a crucial part in the definition and questioning of what it means to 
be a ‘normal’ human, or indeed human at all (Nayar 2013, 11-12). In this thesis, I interrogate 
the complex relationships between Lovecraft’s fiction, Enlightenment humanism, scientific 
rationalism, monstrosity, humanity and normalcy. I hope to provide an analytical angle to 
Lovecraft’s writing that has not been utilized before, and to perhaps make the reader re-think 
their assumptions of what it means to be human. 
 
1.2. Enlightenment humanism and Enlightenment humanity 
 
Unsurprisingly, the concept of Enlightenment humanism and the corresponding concept of 
Enlightenment humanity/Enlightenment human is one that can be traced back to the historical 
movement of the Enlightenment. Beginning in Europe in the 18th century, the Enlightenment 
can be characterized as aiming to replace religion with rationality and science as the 
epistemology that organized the world in the minds of people; or, in the words of Adorno and 
Horkheimer, “[t]he program of the Enlightenment was the disenchantment of the world: the 
dissolution of myths and the substitution of knowledge for fancy” (Adorno and Horkheimer 
1979, 3). This philosophical-political program also involved advocating for liberal reforms 
and societal progress, according to historian Peter Gay (Outram 2013,4). 
This ambitious program for a rational new world was accompanied by a new 
conception of the human that I will here call “Enlightenment human”, and a form of 
humanism that I will refer to as “Enlightenment humanism.” The concepts are closely 
interlinked. The conception of the Enlightenment human is heavily predicated on mental 
characteristics, in particular rational thinking and intelligence, awareness or consciousness of 
one’s self, autonomy and agency, or the capability to decide on one’s actions (Nayar 2013, 
15). These mental or cognitive characteristics are, in Enlightenment humanism, assumed to be 
common to all humans and constitutive of humanity itself. Enlightenment humanism posits a 
universal human, to the point that this creature can be referred to in the singular as the human, 
or sometimes, “Man” (ibid., 15, 23-24). Humanism is “the study of this individual subject” 
(ibid., 15), and typically takes it for granted that the human is at the center of the world, 
dominant over other life forms (ibid., 13). Enlightenment humanism takes a very positive 
outlook on its subject: “Man” is not only the measure of all things, but the gold standard of all 
things (Gandhi 2019, 29). 
Given this background, why has Enlightenment humanism become a target of 




of Human Rights are predicated on Enlightenment humanism, specifically the idea of all 
humans being created equal and “endowed with reason and conscience” (United Nations 
1948). The concepts of inherent human value and human dignity likewise are based on 
Enlightenment humanism (Nayar 2013, 16). However, it turns out that while the principles of 
Enlightenment humanism may sound noble indeed, and the idea of the Enlightenment human 
sounds like one that exalts humanity in all its forms, in reality things have been less rosy. We 
noted that Enlightenment “Man” is constructed chiefly based on mental characteristics, such 
as intelligence and reason. One might think that this idea of the human as a creature of mind 
first would efficiently combat the treatment of some people as less worthy based, for example, 
on the color of their skin or their perceived gender. In practice, it turns out that at the same 
time that the rational Enlightenment “Man” was exalted based on his mental capabilities, 
women and people of color were frequently constructed by many thinkers as less mentally 
capable and, therefore, implicitly less human (Outram 2013, 76, 97-98; Nayar 2013, 23-24, 
30). To give a more obvious example, there are human beings whose cognitive capabilities do 
not match the ideal of the Enlightenment human, such as people with cognitive disabilities, 
and few would dare to openly suggest that such people are not fully human. However, as 
Martha Nussbaum notes, theories of social contracts, which arebasic to the functioning of 
Western societies, tend to imagine society as consisting of “free, equal, and independent” 
(Nussbaum 2006, 98) and rational agents, i.e. Enlightenment humans. Predictably, these 
theories face considerable difficulties when they have to consider the fact that society also 
includes people with cognitive disabilities, and often are not able to adequately resolve these 
issues (ibid., 98.) As it turns out, the supposedly universal Enlightenment human is far from 
universal.  
Leela Gandhi summarizes this failure of Enlightenment humanism’s universality as 
follows: 
 
While both of the humanisms [that is, Renaissance literary humanism and 
Enlightenment scientific humanism] we have been discussing assert that all human 
beings are, as it were, the measure of all things, they simultaneously smuggle a 
disclaimer into their celebratory outlook.  The humanist valorisation of man is almost 
always accompanied by a barely discernible corollary which suggests that some 
human beings are more human than others – either on account of their access to 





Gandhi goes on to describe the concrete consequences of this thinking, where some humans 
are “more substantially the measure of all things” (ibid., 30) than others. Drawing on Kant’s 
characterization of the Enlightenment as an exit from “immaturity into the improved 
condition of maturity (Gandhi 2019, 30), she goes on to note how, for example, in colonial 
India, the colonized people were constructed as “childish” (and implicitly less human) in 
opposition to the enlightened “adult” colonizers. In this way, colonization was “justified” as a 
supposedly necessary process to spread Western Enlightenment to the rest of the world 
(Gandhi 2019, 32-34).  
 In addition to its Eurocentrism, Enlightenment humanism is also characterized by 
anthropocentrism – the idea that human beings are the center of the universe. This conception 
led to the idea that human beings were above other forms of life, and entitled to rule over 
them (Gandhi 2019, 36). Nayar contends that this “hierarchization of life forms” (Nayar 2013, 
48) has led to “catastrophic effects for/upon animals, forests and plant life” (ibid., 48) 
According to Val Plumwood, the Western conception of the human as outside and above 
nature even underlies the current ecological crisis (Plumwood 1993, 2, 191-192). 
Enlightenment humanism, to Gandhi, is near-synonymous with “scientific humanism” 
(Gandhi 2019, 29). By this she means that Enlightenment “Man” is primarily defined by a 
rational epistemology that was central to the development of the scientific method: in all 
interpretations of the Enlightenment, rationality is central, and for many writers on the 
Enlightenment, science embodies that rationality (Outram 2013, 100). Thus, science and the 
Enlightenment are closely linked, although to talk of “Enlightenment science” is 
anachronistic, since in the 18th century, the word “science” did not exist: the term “natural 
philosophy” was commonly used (ibid., 100-101). The term highlights the reason why science 
became a connecting thread between areas of Enlightenment thought (ibid., 100). Nature 
became “an ‘ethical norm’ in the Enlightenment” (ibid., 100), and science gradually emerged 
during the period as the study of nature. 
It has been noted that the scientific program of the Enlightenment created a quest for 
the enlightened scientist to take control of nature by gaining total knowledge of it (Gandhi 
2019: 35-37). However, this quest for knowledge and control turns to fear when the 
Enlightenment encounters something it cannot assimilate in its knowledge-system: the quest 
to know everything is paired with a fear of the unknown and the different. According to 
Gandhi, “modern rationality has often attributed a dangerous Otherness to the figure(s) of the 
deviant” (Gandhi 2019, 40) – the creation of the supposedly universal Enlightenment “man” 




This idea of “dangerous Otherness”, according to David Punter, led to the birth of Gothic 
horror fiction. Punter argues that this was not a coincidence but the consequence of the 
attempt of Enlightenment to eradicate the unknown, which only made the unknown more 
taboo and therefore terrifying (Punter 1980, 26-27).  
Some critics of the Enlightenment go as far as to claim that this fear of alterity and the 
exclusionary logic of Enlightenment humanism led directly and logically to fascism and 
genocide (Adorno and Horkheimer 1979; Gandhi 2019, 40). Whether such historical 
continuums truly inherently resulted from Enlightenment thinking, or whether Enlightenment 
thinking merely failed to prevent them, is beyond the scope of the present work. For the 
present purpose it is enough to note that the legacy of Enlightenment humanism involves the 
past, and in some cases ongoing, exclusion of some groups of people from full humanity, 
implicitly or explicitly. Whether by design or by accident, Enlightenment humanism can be 
used to create unequal power hierarchies in society despite its apparent egalitarianism. 
The influence of the Enlightenment was not limited to Europe or to the 18th century. 
As Europe expanded its political reach around the globe during the 18th century via trade, 
colonialism and imperialism, the Enlightenment turned out to be an idea with global reach. 
The United States, in particular, was established on Enlightenment ideals: “Life, Liberty, and 
the Pursuit of Happiness” (Outram 2013, 4). Timewise, the reach of Enlightenment has been 
far longer than merely the 18th century. Its program of science and progress is one that has 
defined the modern world and even the concept of modernity itself – our modern world, 
shaped by science and technology, is heir to the Enlightenment (Outram 2013, 7, 99-100). 
Furthermore, Jonathan Israel argues that the “value-system and political orientation of the 
West today” (Israel 2006, 57) were born out of the Enlightenment. 
Just as the Enlightenment is not limited to the 18th century but rather forms a 
continuum with modernity, neither should we assume that Enlightenment humanism or 
Enlightenment humanity were confined to the period of Enlightenment. Rather, the 
conception of the Enlightenment human is the image of “human” that has dominated Western 
thinking until late 20th century, when the category of “human” came under critical 
examination in various academic disciplines (Nayar 2013, 12). Therefore, the critical 
examination of Enlightenment humanism and the conceptual category “human” is not merely 






1.3. Monster theory 
 
In the previous section, I reviewed theory relating to the category of “human” that I will use 
in my analysis. In this section, I will focus on theory that deals with monsters with a particular 
focus on monsters in horror fiction, as the works I analyze belong to the horror genre. In his 
seminal work The Philosophy of Horror or Paradoxes of the Heart (1990), Noël Carroll 
writes a lengthy analysis about monsters in the context of horror fiction – or, to be more 
precise, art-horror (Carroll 1990, 12-13). Carroll defines art-horror as a genre that separated 
from Gothic fiction beginning from the last half of the 18th century and which is characterized 
by the intention to provoke a certain affect – the emotion of art-horror – in the reader or 
viewer of the work. This emotion, in turn, is one of combined disgust and fear, provoked by 
the monster or monsters in the story (ibid., 19). 
An astute reader notices, at this point, an apparent flaw in Carroll’s claim: how do we 
know what effects a work of fiction is intended to cause in the audience? Authorial intention 
is a notoriously thorny question in the study of literature (see Farrell 2017). Carroll argues 
that in art-horror, this question is unusually easy to answer, as a work of horror will instruct 
the audience in how to react to it: the audience’s responses to the events on the screen or page 
are supposed to parallel those of the “positive humans” in the story. The humans of the story 
feel terror and revulsion at the sight and touch of the monster, and the audience feels similar 
emotions as they witness the scene; although Carroll notes that the emotions of the human 
characters and the audience are not exactly the same, as the audience does not believe the 
monster to be real (ibid., 18). 
Carroll does not make it very clear what he means by “positive human”. As I 
understand his use of the term, a positive human is a “true” human character and not, for 
example, a character who initially appears human but who is later revealed to be a monster 
masquerading as a human. There is an interesting corollary to be made concerning the role of 
humans in art-horror that Carroll does not explicate. Carroll writes at length on the 
indispensability of monsters to art-horror – but what he does not explicate is that positive 
human characters are, likewise, essential to the genre of art-horror. Without positive humans 
in the story to model appropriate responses for the audience, the audience would not 
necessarily feel the emotions that characterize art-horror – as Carroll notes, monsters are 
present in many genres that are not art-horror, such as fairytales and myths (ibid., 16). In other 
words, horror stories need monsters, but they also need humans whom the monsters horrify. 




frequently considered an “anti-humanist” writer, but applying Carroll’s theory, his works 
must contain some sort of humanity to guide the readers’ reactions to the monsters. 
Let us now look at monsters and their central role in art-horror. Carroll proposes a 
fairly simple initial definition for a monster: “any being not believed to exist now according 
to contemporary science” (ibid., 27). This definition will be refined very soon to better 
describe monsters in art-horror. However, in this initial definition there is another corollary 
that Carroll also remarks upon later (ibid., 55-57): the existence of monsters is predicated on 
the limits of scientific knowledge, i.e. the knowledge system of science is necessary for the 
genre of art-horror. The monsters in art-horror inhabit the margins and gaps of scientific 
knowledge. We will discuss this liminal property of monsters in more detail shortly: but this 
corollary seems to combine in interesting ways with the relationship between Enlightenment 
(scientific) humanism and the emergence of Gothic fiction, discussed in section 1.2. Carroll, 
too, entertains the idea that Gothic horror, and in turn art-horror, were born as a reaction to the 
Enlightenment’s overemphasis on scientific rationality: “[w]here the Enlightenment valorizes 
reason, the horror novel explores emotions […] in opposition to the Enlightenment’s faith in 
progress, the horror novel indulges regression” (ibid., 56). He admits that the historical 
causality is hard to verify empirically, but concludes that in the conceptual sense, the 
opposition between Enlightenment and horror is valid regardless of whether the early readers 
and writers of Gothic literature thought of themselves as acting in opposition to the 
Enlightenment (ibid., 57). 
Next, we need to improve the definition of monsters in art-horror. Carroll’s initial 
definition is not quite sufficient for the genre of art-horror: he expands the definition by 
stating that in addition to being currently non-existent according to science, the monster must 
also be in some fashion threatening to humans and, usually, disgusting (ibid., 28). Referring 
to Mary Douglas’s classic study Purity and Danger (1966), Carroll stipulates that the horror 
and disgust that monsters elicit is due to their being in some way impure: and that this 
impurity is a result of their being in violation of the “natural order”, or rather the categories 
that humans construct to make sense of the world they live in (Carroll 1990, 31-32). This 
liminal property of monsters, that they are always “category violations” and horrifying as a 
result of this property, is crucial to my analysis. Monsters are, fundamentally, creatures that 
challenge and violate the conceptual schemes of humans. This creates an additional aspect in 
the threat that monsters pose to the positive human character (and, by extension, to the 
audiences) of art-horror: besides their physical threat, monsters are cognitively threatening, 




mental construction of the world (ibid., 16). Here, too, we can see the idea that horror is the 
“underside of the Enlightenment” (ibid., 56): for monsters to be “unnatural”, there must exist 
a conception of “nature,” which was central to Enlightenment thought (ibid., 55).  
Carroll gives a detailed account of the characteristics and role of monsters in the 
limited realm of art-horror, but as Jeffrey Jerome Cohen argues in his influential Monster 
Theory: Reading Culture (1996), there are some characteristics of monsters that can be 
recognized in literature and culture in general. In Cohen’s view, monsters are cultural 
signifiers that reveal something about the anxieties of the culture that spawned them: 
monsters should always be read in relation to the social, cultural and literary-historical context 
that they appear in (Cohen 1996, 5-6). Cohen makes a very similar point to Carroll about the 
“ontological liminality” of monsters that threatens the categories that humans see as natural 
and fundamental to the construction of reality: 
  
 This refusal to participate in the classificatory “order of things” is true of monsters 
generally: they are disturbing hybrids whose externally incoherent bodies resist attempts 
to include them in any systematic structuration. And so the monster is dangerous, a 
form suspended between forms that threatens to smash distinctions. (ibid., 6) 
 
The “forms” that the monster straddles are myriad: monsters can violate the borders between 
humans and animals, between different species, between male and female, between living and 
dead, and many more. The monster is, deep down, a device that questions ontological 
categories constructed by humans, the “order of things”. This makes them not only physically, 
but also morally and cognitively dangerous.  Cohen, too, connects literary and cultural 
monsters to science and sees monsters as resistant to the attempts of science to comprehend 
and order reality: “In the face of the monster, scientific inquiry and its ordered rationality 
crumble” (ibid., 7).  
Another side of the boundary-breaking property of monsters is that many monsters 
embody cultural Otherness in some way.  Cohen gives numerous examples of how various 
groups that are othered and seen as “not us” have historically been represented as monstrous 
and thus threatening: the examples range from Biblical times to the modern era. Most of the 
examples represent racial difference made monstrous, but Cohen notes that “[any] kind of 
alterity can be inscribed across (constructed through) the monstrous body” (ibid., 7), although 
the most common types of monstrous alterity are “cultural, political, racial, economical, 




is important to my analysis, particularly regarding SoI: in SoI, monsters participate in the 
construction of humanity by showing who is othered and excluded from full humanity.  
Monsters are, fundamentally, creatures of borders and limits. They not only embody 
the twilight zones between ontological categories, but they also “[police] the borders of the 
possible” (ibid., 12). By this, Cohen means that many monsters are warning signs (the word 
monster originates from monstrum, “that which warns” [ibid., 4]) against culturally prohibited 
behavior. In numerous ancient and classical myths, humans are transformed into monsters as 
a punishment for violating some taboo (ibid., 12-13). By showing what is prohibited, 
monsters simultaneously make visible the perimeter that a culture draws around acceptable, 
normal, human behavior. This far, and no further: there be dragons.  
A particularly common class of prohibitions that is expressed through monsters is 
related to sexual behavior. Many a monster exists to enforce rules against incest, 
miscegenation or homosexuality (vampires, from Le Fanu’s Carmilla to HBO’s True Blood 
series, being commonly associated with the latter [ibid., 5]). Monstrosity that results from 
violating the taboo against miscegenation is a theme that runs from the Bible to 20th century 
horror movies (ibid., 15-16), and it will also be relevant for my discussion of The Shadow 
over Innsmouth.  
In violating borders and categories, monsters make those borders and categories 
visible. Those borders and categories, in turn, are essential to the construction of humanity: 
categories construct humans’ understanding of the world, and borders delineate what a human 
is allowed to do, what a human being can be. It follows that monsters, as cultural phenomena, 
are essential to the construction of the conceptual category ‘human’: this is the ultimate 
category that the monster interrogates with its existence. In Cohen’s words, “[the monster is] 
an abjecting epistemological device basic to the mechanics of deviance construction and 
identity formation” (ibid., ix) – the identity being formed here is the identity of a human. For 
this reason, I have chosen to include an analysis of monsters when analyzing the humanity in 
SoI and MM. The analysis of monsters offers an alternative and fruitful point of view to the 
analysis of humanity.   
 
1.4. Text history and primary text versions 
 
In this section, I will briefly review the text histories of my primary texts and the versions I 
have chosen to use, as well as the reasons for that choice. While The Shadow over Innsmouth 




rather simple, the case of At the Mountains of Madness is more complicated. MM was first 
published in the pulp magazine Astounding Stories in a serialized format, and this version was 
edited in ways that did not please Lovecraft (ibid., 372). This raises interesting questions 
about what the “authentic” or “original” text version of MM is. I will not delve into this issue 
here, but due to the fact that there exist different text versions of MM, has I have chosen to 
analyze two versions of each text: the version printed in Necronomicon: The Best Weird Tales 
of H.P. Lovecraft: Commemorative Edition (2008) as well as the online versions available at 
“The H.P. Lovecraft Archive” (www.hplovecraft.com).  
The printed versions of the texts were chosen on the basis of availability, whereas the 
online versions were chosen on the basis of availability and due to the fact that the website is 
maintained, among others, by S. T. Joshi, who has written several books on Lovecraft as well 
as edited an edition of his works, The Annotated H.P. Lovecraft (1997). Given Joshi’s 
reputation as an expert on Lovecraft’s works, I feel rather confident that the online versions 
can be considered “authentic”: but to be surer of textual correctness, I have compared the 
online and Necronomicon versions of both texts while writing the analysis. The two versions 
of SoI are virtually identical except for that Necronomicon uses more modernized spelling and 
sometimes different punctuation. This similarity is probably to be expected due to SoI’s 
unproblematic text history. The versions of MM differ more: in some places, the online 
version contains short passages of text that are missing from the Necronomicon version, in 
addition to similar differences of spelling and punctuation as in SoI. Differences between the 
text versions are indicated in the text of the thesis where relevant for the analysis: differences 
and spelling and punctuation, however, are not indicated. All page numbers provided are 
those of Necronomicon, as the online versions do not have page numbers. All quotes from 







2. Analysis of The Shadow over Innsmouth 
 
This chapter will investigate the SoI narrator’s Enlightenment human qualities and how the 
category of “human” is constructed in the story. My method of analysis will be dual: I will 
analyze the narrator and other positive human characters of the story, but also the monsters. 
This is due to the fact that literary monsters often function as devices that mark the boundaries 
of the human category. The analysis will also delve into the subtle and less subtle racialization 
of the non-human monsters, and how this creates a boundary limiting humanity, or at least 




The Shadow over Innsmouth (henceforth shortened SoI) tells the mystery of a fictitious New 
England town called Innsmouth. The narrator, a young, college-educated man on a poor 
man’s grand tour of New England, learns of the existence of the town, which is plagued by a 
mysterious decay and whose inhabitants acquire a distinctive and repulsive “Innsmouth look” 
in their physical appearance as they age (see section 2.3.2. for a detailed description of their 
appearance). The narrator takes it upon himself to find out the cause of Innsmouth’s decay 
and the strangeness of its people. He learns that the reason for both is that the people of 
Innsmouth have interbred with non-human but demonstrably intelligent marine creatures 
called the Deep Ones, creating a hybrid population. These Innsmouth hybrids become more 
and more like the Deep Ones as they age, eventually leaving land and joining the Deep Ones 
deep in the sea. As night falls, he is attacked by the inhabitants of the town and escapes 
Innsmouth on foot, relaying to the Federal government his information on the existential 
danger facing humanity.  
After his investigation of and escape from Innsmouth, the narrator learns, to his horror, 
that he himself is descended from the Innsmouth hybrids, and he starts to undergo the 
transformation and acquire “the Innsmouth look”. The story ends on an ambiguous note: the 
narrator expresses an intention of “taking to the water” and joining the Deep Ones in the sea, 
but it is not quite clear whether his traumatic experiences have caused him to go insane and 
hallucinate his transformation, or whether he truly undergoes the transformation and his 






2.2. The humans 
 
In this section, I analyze the narrator of SoI, particularly his ways of acquiring information 
about the mystery of Innsmouth. As noted in the Introduction, epistemology is central to the 
concept of Enlightenment humanity; or: humanity is a “function of the way in which man 
knows things” (Gandhi 2019, 29, emphasis in original). Therefore, if I wish to analyze the 
novella’s narrator as an example of Enlightenment humanity, it is useful to look at how he 
acquires information during the course of the story.  
 
2.2.1. The narrator: alternating between two epistemological modes 
 
The narrator has access to two epistemological modes, which alternate during the story.  The 
first one, which is dominant for most of the story, is a rational “scientist mindset” consistent 
with the Enlightenment humanist “Man”. The second one is an irrational, intuitive, partly 
non-conscious mode, which is triggered by exposure to the monsters at Innsmouth and which 
allows him to know the monsters, which are unknowable to a rational human. 
First, let me explain what I mean by the narrator’s “scientist mindset”. The narrator 
implicitly approaches solving the mystery of Innsmouth, in many respects, like a rationalist 
scientist. Before he travels to Innsmouth to make his field observations of the town, he 
“look[s] up data” (509) about the town at a library. Note the use of the word “data” rather than 
“information,” since the usage repeats several times in the story (see 519, 549, 550), 
suggesting that this is a very deliberate word choice. Furthermore, during the course of the 
story, the narrator collects data about Innsmouth from multiple sources and informants. The 
data acquired in this way is remarkably consistent (to the point of the story becoming 
repetitive), which appears to suggest that the narrator’s story is factually true within the 
fictional universe. 
Having thus acquired background data about Innsmouth, the narrator then travels to 
the spot to do observations with a scientific eye (“To my architectural and historical 
anticipations was now added an acute anthropological zeal…” [511]), or at least he sees 
himself as doing so. It is noteworthy that even though he appears to view the inhabitants of 
Innsmouth as basically humans in the species sense (see section 2.3.2.), the narration still 
repeatedly calls them “specimens” (518, 519), dehumanizing them as the objects of his 
research. 
However, there are multiple instances in the story where the narrator’s “scientist 




monstrous inhabitants, he slips into a different, intuitive mode of acquiring knowledge, as in 
the following excerpt when he sees the driver of the bus that takes him to Innsmouth: 
 
This, I reflected, must be the Joe Sargent mentioned by the ticket-agent; and even 
before I noticed any details there spread over me a wave of spontaneous aversion 
which could be neither checked nor explained. It suddenly struck me as very natural 
that the local people should not wish to ride on a bus owned and driven by this man, or 
to visit any oftener than possible the habitat of such a man and his kinsfolk. (512)  
 
The “wave of spontaneous aversion” is immediately followed by a paragraph of rational 
inspection and a clinical description, with few explicitly value-laden descriptors, of Joe 
Sargent’s appearance: “When the driver came out of the store I looked at him more carefully 
and tried to determine the source of my evil impression” (512). The description suggests a 
“dull, expressionless face” and “cutaneous disease” (512), but otherwise it is somewhat hard 
to see any rational reason why Joe Sargent should have given the narrator an “evil” 
impression – even skin disease should be only cause for disgust at most, rather than an 
impression of malice or evil. 
This pattern repeats several times in the story: the narrator is struck by ominous and 
fearful impressions when confronted with the people of Innsmouth, but he is able to quickly 
return to his rational mode. In his rational state of mind, he can no longer make sense of why 
he felt such horror. This pattern is well exemplified by this quote, where the narrator observes 
the people of Innsmouth: “Somehow these people seemed more disquieting than the dismal 
buildings, for almost every one had certain peculiarities of face and motions which I 
instinctively disliked without being able to define or comprehend them” (515, emphasis 
added). The Innsmouth people inspire instinctive dislike in the narrator, but he is not able to 
analyze or understand the precise characteristics in the Innsmouth people that cause him to 
dislike them. The monstrous people of Innsmouth hover just beyond the reach of the 
narrator’s ability to know them with his rational mind: it is left to his non-rational instinct – 
and emotions – to recognize them as subtly outside humanity. 
At times, the narrator manages to dispel the knowledge supplied by his instincts and 
rationalize the horror away, as in the following excerpt: 
 
And as I looked, a certain object crossed or seemed to cross that dark rectangle; 




maddening because analysis could not show a single nightmarish quality in it. 
[…] The thing which had probably caught my first subconscious glance and supplied 
the touch of bizarre horror was the tall tiara he wore; an almost exact duplicate of the 
one Miss Tilton had shown me the previous evening. […] There was not, I soon 
decided, any reason why I should have felt that shuddering touch of evil pseudo-
memory. Was it not natural that a local mystery cult should adopt among its 
regimentals a unique type of head-dress made familiar to the community in some 
strange way – perhaps as treasure-trove? (516) 
 
As shown in this excerpt, contact with the mystery of Innsmouth causes the narrator 
subconsciously to be horrified, but his rational mind cannot determine the cause of that 
horror; and, once the narrator recovers his rational epistemological mode, it is almost as if the 
emotion of horror itself disappears. The horror that the monstrosity of Innsmouth inspires 
exists only as vague impressions that cannot be analyzed or comprehended by Enlightenment 
rationality, as in the quote from the passage above: “analysis could not show a single 
nightmarish quality of it”. The monstrosity in Innsmouth is something that Enlightenment 
rationality, for all its supposed ability to know and control all of the world, simply cannot 
know. 
As it turns out, the intuitive knowledge of the monsters that the narrator has acquired, 
even though not quite accessible to his rational mind, saves him when the monsters try to 
enter his hotel room, whose door he has bolted. Consciously, the narrator appears to have 
minimized the presence of any danger in his mind, despite all the menacing things he has 
heard of Innsmouth, but his subconscious has sensed the danger and prepared him for escape:  
 
My sensations upon recognising this sign of actual peril were perhaps less rather than 
more tumultuous because of my previous vague fears. I had been, albeit without 
definite reason, instinctively on my guard – and that was to my advantage in the new 
and real crisis, whatever it might turn out to be. […] The readiness with which I fell 
into a plan of action proves that I must have been subconsciously fearing some menace 
and considering possible avenues of escape for hours. From the first I felt that the 
unseen fumbler meant a danger not to be met or dealt with…. (536, emphasis added) 
 
In the quote above, the narrator is calmer and better able to rationally plan his escape because, 




for what they are, his nonrational instincts have. Note how the narrator does not know, but 
rather feels, that the “unseen fumbler” at his door is dangerous. The alternation of emotions 
and reason continues throughout the story. The dual description, where the narrator first 
describes the Innsmouth creatures with terrified, disgusted impressions and then returns to an 
objective, almost dissecting way of description, occurs once more when the narrator views the 
procession of the monsters on a moonlit clearing during his escape from Innsmouth: 
 
And yet I saw them in a limitless stream – flopping, hopping, croaking, bleating – 
surging inhumanly through the spectral moonlight in a grotesque, malignant saraband 
of fantastic nightmare. […] I think their predominant colour was a greyish-green, 
though they had white bellies. They were mostly shiny and slippery, but the ridges of 
their backs were scaly. Their forms vaguely suggested the anthropoid, while their 
heads were the heads of fish, with prodigious bulging eyes that never closed. At the 
sides of their necks were palpitating gills, and their long paws were webbed. They 
hopped irregularly, sometimes on two legs and sometimes on four. I was somehow 
glad that they had no more than four limbs. Their croaking, baying voices, clearly used 
for articulate speech, held all the dark shades of expression which their staring faces 
lacked. (548-549) 
 
In this scene, the narrator’s worldview is shattered as he witnesses fully transformed 
Innsmouth hybrids. Previously, he has been able to view the inhabitants of Innsmouth as 
“abnormal” humans (this idea will be developed more fully in section 2.3.2.), but now, as he 
sees their clearly nonhuman bodies “in objective flesh” (548), he can no longer sustain that 
notion. Having witnessed this clear evidence of a clearly nonhuman species that is capable of 
“articulate speech”, the narrator promptly faints. The upsetting thing here is not only exposure 
to a sight that monstrously violates his idea of how the creatures of the world should be 
categorized – humans clearly as humans and animals as animals – but the fact that he has 
encountered a non-human species that carries signs of thinking and civilization.  Even though 
the narrator cannot understand their speech, he can now identify it as speech, rather than just 
meaningless sounds.  Previously, when he heard the creatures speak, he was only able to 
describe it as “hoarse barkings and loose-syllabled croakings [that] bore so little resemblance 
to recognised human speech” (537) and was not even sure if the “noises” were voices or not. 




civilization. A similar emphasis on language is a recurring theme in Lovecraft’s fiction (see 
George 2016, 171.) 
In other words, this is an instance where humanity is unseated from its place as the 
undeniable center of the universe and the pinnacle of nature: there are contenders, and 
threatening ones at that. (As we will see, this idea is more fully developed in At the Mountains 
of Madness.) The cognitive threat of the monsters is twofold here: both the “disturbance of 
natural order” described by Carroll (Carroll 1990, 16, 32) that the Innsmouth monsters present 
in their hybrid, fish-frog-vaguely “anthropoid” (human- or ape-like) bodies, and the fact that 
they threaten humans’ self-understanding as the center and top of the world. 
To conclude, the novella’s narrator shows qualities that clearly mark him as a 
representative of Enlightenment humanity: an explicitly rational way of acquiring information 
and approaching the mystery before him. However, this is undermined by the fact that his 
rationality is not sufficient or appropriate for truly knowing the monsters of Innsmouth, which 
lie outside the purview of rational humanity, as violations of the “natural order” constructed 
by scientific humanity: they can only be known by reverting to an intuitive, more emotional 
mode of knowing. Enlightenment humanity is thus both constructed and undermined in the 
story. 
 
2.2.2. The other human characters 
 
In this section, I will analyze the other positive human characters in the story 
(see section 1.3. in the Introduction for the concept of “positive human” as used by Carroll 
1990). A caveat: the line between positive human characters and monsters is not necessarily 
an easy or safe one to draw in SoI, as humanity in the story is precarious and easily 
contaminated. As it turns out (see section 2.4.), not even the ostensibly human narrator 
remains one by the end of the story: he finds out that he himself is descended from the Deep 
Ones, and he undergoes the physical transformation into a creature of Innsmouth. However, 
the narration appears to draw a clear line between the “normal” humans and the “abnormal” 
monsters that the narrator meets; therefore, for the lack of a better concept, I will use that 
division to classify the characters of SoI. 
A noteworthy feature of these positive human characters in the story – the ticket-agent, 
the librarian Miss Tilton, the boy at the grocery store, and Zadok Allen – is that they receive 
very little, if any, characterization, and they have nearly no meaningful interaction with the 




dispensers for the narrator as he delves into the mystery of Innsmouth: the narrator even refers 
to them as his “informants” (505, 518, 519). Save for Zadok Allen, the characters are 
basically interchangeable “talking heads”, characters in name only. 
Zadok Allen, the old, possibly mentally ill alcoholic is however a more interesting 
case. Living in the poorhouse and spending his days loitering and drunk whenever possible 
(note that the story explicitly takes place during Prohibition), he occupies a liminal space at 
the margins of society and of rational, respectable humanity (Gandhi 2019, 40). He also 
serves as the narrator’s most valuable informant regarding the mystery of Innsmouth. No one 
else is able to provide the narrator with the secret of the Deep Ones who have interbred with 
the people of Innsmouth and sometimes come out of the sea at night, a story that the narrator 
dismisses as a myth but that appears to be confirmed by the later events of the novella. While 
Zadok’s madness – that is, his loss of rationality – appears to be a consequence of his 
knowing the secret of Innsmouth, his liminal location at the very edge of rational humanity 
apparently allows him to have the knowledge of the true nature of the monsters. If the 
monsters are unknowable to rational humanity, as seen in the previous section, then it takes 
someone who has partially left the purview of rational humanity to know them. 
  
2.3. The monsters 
 
2.3.1. Monstrous hybridity 
  
The monsters of The Shadow over Innsmouth are the “Deep Ones”, creatures that live in a city 
deep under the sea off the coast of Innsmouth. They are capable of interbreeding with 
humans: the offspring of those unions start their lives appearing outwardly human, but as they 
progress in age, they acquire the “Innsmouth look” and become more and more like the Deep 
Ones. Eventually, they transform fully into Deep Ones and “take to the water” (553), joining 
other Deep Ones in the underwater city. 
The narrator describes the Deep Ones - or hybrids of Deep Ones and humans far along 
in their transformation – that he sees during the pivotal night scene as “blasphemous fish-
frogs” (549): “Their forms vaguely suggested the anthropoid, while their heads were the 
heads of fish, with prodigious bulging eyes that never closed” (548). Everything about these 
creatures embodies hybridity. In their bodies, they incorporate two different nonhuman 
animals (fish and frogs). They “[hop] irregularly, sometimes on two legs and sometimes on 




meaningful aspect of their hybridity, and the one that makes them truly threatening to 
(Enlightenment) humanity, is their breaking of the human-nonhuman border: although quite 
clearly a different species, they can breed with humans and thus violate a supposedly 
inviolable biological boundary, the species border. Furthermore, their offspring make the 
species border even more fluid, as they apparently move from one species category to another 
during their lifetime - they start their life looking like “normal” humans, but become more and 
more like the Deep Ones in appearance as they progress in age, eventually leaving land and 
taking to the sea once their transformation is complete. The meaning of the species border is 
questioned altogether in this transformation: by changing from one species to another during 
their lifetime, these creatures violate the laws of nature.  
We are deep in the territory that Carroll describes when he tells us that the horror that 
monsters inspire arises from category violations (Carroll 1990, 34). Categories are not natural 
as such, but rather something humans construct to make sense of their world and to create a 
semblance of control over their environment: monsters are creatures that pose not only a 
physical but, more importantly, a mental threat to the way things should be (ibid., 34). It is in 
fact noteworthy in SoI that it is not clear that the monsters pose a physical threat to the 
narrator. The narrator merely assumes that they do, and they certainly form a mortal threat to 
the way he comprehends the world: “It was the end, for whatever remains to me of life on the 
surface of this earth, of every vestige of mental peace and confidence in the integrity of 
Nature and of the human mind” (548). As briefly noted by Joshi in Weird Tale (Joshi 1990b, 
223), it is possible that, given that the narrator himself is descended from the Deep Ones, the 
monsters are not hostile to him at all but rather wish to welcome him in their midst. However, 
probably because the narrator is still a positive human at that point, he is unable to perceive 
that possibility and instead only sees the creatures as a physical threat. 
 
2.3.2. “Abnormal horror” 
 
The Innsmouth creatures have all the usual characteristics of horror monsters: they breach the 
laws of nature, they inspire fear and disgust in the narrator, and they are hybrid. However, it is 
noteworthy that for most of the story, the narrator does not in fact consider the Innsmouth 
denizens he meets to be nonhuman in the strict species sense. Instead, he repeatedly describes 
them as “abnormal” but implicitly human, stricken by some disease or “degeneration”: while 
he hears tales of the Deep Ones during the course of the story, he initially considers them the 




the travel agent as “queer narrow heads with flat noses and bulgy stary eyes that never seem 
to shut, and their skin ain’t quite right. Rough and scabby, and the sides of their necks are all 
shrivelled or creased up” (507). The narrator also notes a “peculiarly shambling gait and saw 
that [Joe Sargent’s] feet were inordinately immense” (512). Note in these early quotes how 
the narration mentions the fish-like attributes of Innsmouth denizens, such as gills on the sides 
on their necks and webbed feet, without explicitly describing them as such: the full reveal of 
the horror is saved for later. 
The narrator’s perception only changes late in the story, when he sees a procession of 
“fish-frogs” so far removed from humanity that he can no longer justify their appearance as a 
mere “abnormal” element inserted in humanity. He certainly tries hard to keep thinking of the 
creatures as “abnormal humans”, just before he describes the procession of the creatures: “My 
other pursuers had been accursedly abnormal—so should I not have been ready to face a 
strengthening of the abnormal element; to look upon forms in which there was no mixture of 
the normal at all?” (548, emphasis in original) This is a curious passage – “normal” here 
appears to refer to what the narrator has defined as “normal” humanity, and the abnormal the 
nonhuman element in Innsmouth denizens. In the quote, the narrator talks about fully 
transformed Innsmouth denizens who have undeniably become nonhuman – “forms in which 
there was no mixture of the normal at all”. It is clear that “normal” here means “human”, and 
“abnormality” means nonhuman. 
The idea of normality, applied to humans, is a value-laden one, as shown by e.g. Grue 
and Heiberg (2006) in their discussion of the historical development of the concept. The 
concept of the statistical “normal” as developed by Adolphe Quetelet in the 19th century 
began innocently enough as the observation that many human features, on the population 
level, were statistically distributed according to the so-called normal distribution.  However, 
Grue and Heiberg argue, along with Davis (2006), that the idea of “the average man” (whose 
features corresponded to the “normal”) became conflated with an ideal man – what humans 
normatively should be, not just what they statistically were.  
Grue and Heiberg further discuss how the statistician and eugenicist Frances Galton 
built on Quetelet’s work to turn the normal distribution into a tool for rank-ordering people 
according to their “civic and genetic worth”. Those whose qualities fell below the average 
“normal” were considered of less worth, whereas the “normal” masses capable of benefiting 
society were labeled “respectable” and the statistically rarer people endowed with “better” 
than average qualities were considered of higher worth (Grue and Heiberg, 2006). Normal, 




participation in society, or indeed worthy of life (the “normal”), and those who were not (the 
“abnormal”). Grue and Heiberg cite the Nazi eugenics program and eventually the Holocaust 
as examples of the worst consequences of this othering way of thinking, and argue that the 
pressure towards normalization still affects the lives of people with disabilities.  
The social prerogative to normality, of course, does not only affect people with 
disabilities: sexual and gender minorities too, for example, feel the pressure to be “normal” 
(as opposed to “deviant”). The pressure towards normalization is related to monsters and their 
function as the guardians of the boundaries of socially acceptable behavior, discussed in 
section 1.3. Ingebretsen (1998) writes on the normalizing social function of monsters: 
monsters act as the warning examples of what an acceptable citizen must not do, and thus the 
acceptable (“normal”) citizen is constructed through the monster via negation. Ingebretsen 
points out that people who fail to perform gender “correctly” or act in a way that society 
considers sexually “deviant” frequently are treated as monsters. Again, we discover monsters 
as devices of border construction: this time the border is the one separating normality from 
abnormality and socially acceptable behavior from socially abhorrent behavior. Implicitly, 
this border is simultaneously the same one that bounds humanity (Ingebretsen 1998, 30): 
abnormal turns out to equal “not (fully) human.” 
Now that we have reviewed the significance of the normal/abnormal distinction, let us 
look at some more examples of that distinction in SoI. When investigating the mystery of 
Innsmouth, the narrator learns that “[i]t would be of no use […] to ask the natives anything 
about the place. The only one who would talk was a very aged but normal-looking man who 
lived at the poorhouse on the north rim of the town…” (518, emphasis added). The passage 
refers to Zadok Allen, described in section 2.2.2. The mention of his age is significant 
because previously in the text the “Innsmouth look” has been stated to become worse and 
more “abnormal” as the individual ages. The “normality” that Allen has retained despite his 
advanced age marks him as not “tainted” or “aberrant” (518): in other words, fully and 
undoubtedly human.  
Just before this, we have been treated to the following narration, as the narrator 
acquires information about Innsmouth from a young man working in a local grocery store: 
 
The youth was certain that many specimens even worse than the worst visible ones 
were kept locked indoors in some places. People sometimes heard the queerest kind of 
sounds. The tottering waterfront hovels north of the river were reputedly connected by 





Of note is the way in which the “abnormal” inhabitants of Innsmouth are dehumanized in the 
passage: aside from the objectifying word choice “specimens”, as mentioned in section 2.2.1., 
the word “warren” leads one to think of the inhabitants as burrowing animals. This is far from 
the only time the narrator dehumanizes the inhabitants of Innsmouth, even when he putatively 
describes them as belonging to the human species. The dehumanization and description of the 
Innsmouth natives as “abnormal”, appearing side by side in the text, once again strengthen the 
impression that “normality” is a property of those deemed fully human. 
The dehumanization, and the accompanying marking of “normality” as a property 
belonging to humans, is clearly visible in the following passage: “Furtive, shambling 
creatures stared cryptically in my direction, and more normal faces eyed me coldly and 
curiously” (522, emphasis added). “Furtive” and “shambling” are descriptors that frequently 
stick to the people of Innsmouth, and “furtive”, in particular, is connected in the text to 
animals that hide from humans: “[The Innsmouth people] were as furtive and seldom seen as 
animals that live in burrows…” (518). The words relate, more or less, how the denizens of 
Innsmouth move and carry themselves: “furtive” expressing that they tend to avoid humans 
such as the narrator, and “shambling” describing a slow, dragging type of walking. 
Combined, the descriptors appear to connote lack of propriety and honesty. 
There is one more occurrence of “abnormality” in the text worth mentioning, one 
slightly stranger than the others. This one occurs during the narrator’s escape from 
Innsmouth, when he looks out to the sea:  
 
Far out beyond the breakwater was the dim, dark line of Devil Reef, and as I glimpsed 
it I could not help thinking of all the hideous legends I had heard in the last thirty-four 
hours – legends which portrayed this ragged rock as a veritable gateway to realms of 
unfathomed horror and inconceivable abnormality. (542)  
 
The use of the word “abnormality” is somewhat strange here, as the narrator is referring to 
Zadok Allen’s tale, which marks Devil Reef as a place where Obed Marsh would perform 
sacrificial rites to call the Deep Ones up from the sea. The narrator should have no reason to 
refer to the Deep Ones as “abnormal”, as, according to the tale, they are not of the human 
species and therefore are outside the normal/abnormal dichotomy - and yet he does. It appears 




“unnatural”, making the value judgment of the normality/abnormality dichotomy obvious. 
Normal is desirable and abnormal something to be shunned, avoided and feared. 
As we will see, the ideas of normality/abnormality (and the value judgments present in 
the division), coupled with other signifiers attached to the monsters of SoI, have far-reaching 
implications for the image of humanity that is constructed in the story. To better understand 





Clearly, in the eyes of the educated, Innsmouth was merely an exaggerated case of 
civic degeneration. (509) 
 
This is first instance where degeneration is mentioned by name in the text. It occurs fairly 
early on, after the ticket agent has provided the narrator with basic information about 
Innsmouth as well as several alternative explanations for the town’s decline and dark 
reputation. These include devil-worshipping (which the agent dismisses as ridiculous), the 
epidemic of 1846 taking out the “best blood” in the town, and finally the attribution of the 
“strangeness” of the Innsmouth folk to interbreeding with people from “queer ports in Africa, 
Asia, the South Seas” (507). Make note of this racist notion that the “strangeness” of 
Innsmouth is the result of racial mixing (assuming that the inhabitants of Innsmouth, a town 
in New England, are white and the people in these “queer ports” are not): it is crucial for the 
analysis of degeneration in SoI. 
Historically, degeneration is a complex idea that started its life in the 19th century as a 
medical diagnosis and an explanation for various medical conditions, but which then 
expanded to a more general, putatively scientific concept of “racial decline” (Pick 1989, 8-9, 
21, 230).  Degeneration was seen as a biological force that “produced degeneracy in society” 
(ibid., 21): thus, via heredity, degeneration was not only of concern for the afflicted individual 
but the whole society. As Pick notes, there were also strong racist aspects to the idea of 
degeneration. In the 19th century, the concept of degeneration came to include the notion that 
the “white race” was the pinnacle of evolution and the other races (as they were construed in 
the biological sciences of the time) were “degenerate,” placed below white people on a 
ranking scale of humanity (ibid., 21, 61-62). Degeneration was, in a sense, the flip side of the 




time might start to run backwards towards an atavistic, primitive past (ibid., 62; McClintock 
1998, 9). 
There exists a connection between the ideas of degeneration and normality: Pick notes 
that the term degeneration was often applied to “deviations from the ‘normal type’ of 
humanity” (ibid., 50). Various physical conditions, moral failures and mental illnesses were 
all seen as the products of degeneration. Furthermore, Pick notes that, over time, degeneration 
expanded from a medical concept - explaining the medical problems of an individual - to a 
sociological one that was used to explain social ills (Pick 1989, 20). We can see both uses of 
the concept operating in SoI. “Biological degeneration” (513) is named as a possible 
explanation for Joe Sargent’s (the Innsmouth bus driver’s) “odd” and “alien” (512-513) 
appearance, but the town’s general decay is also explained by “civic degeneration” (509). The 
“death and decay” (522) of Innsmouth are not confined to the people, but are instead visible 
in the dilapidated buildings themselves: it is as if degeneration is spreading from the people to 
their physical environment. The idea of degeneration as spreading outwards from the affected 
individuals to the wider society is even taken as far as the narrator hypothesizing that the town 
is causing “contagious madness” (547) or mass hallucinations of horrors in the “normal” 
people from outside who visit it. 
The social or cultural sense of “degeneration” is also present in the story, as evidenced 
by this quote where the narrator interviews an elderly librarian about Innsmouth: “[Miss 
Tilton’s] own attitude toward shadowed Innsmouth – which she had never seen – was one of 
disgust at a community slipping far down the cultural scale…” (511). The excerpt shows a 
rank-ordering of cultures from “primitive” to “civilized” – not entirely unlike Galton’s rank-
ordering of people – as well as the possibility of a culture or society “degenerating” to a lower 
rung on that ladder. 
Let us next look at instances where the narration uses the medical sense of 
“degeneration” – in other words, describes the people of Innsmouth and their difference in 
terms of disease. The rhetoric of disease is present from the narrator’s first encounter with an 
Innsmouth native, the bus driver Joe Sargent, where the narrator notes that, among other 
unusual and vaguely disgusting features in the man’s appearance, “in places, the surface [of 
his cheeks] seemed queerly irregular, as if peeling from some cutaneous disease” (512). When 
the narrator reaches Innsmouth and questions the youth at the grocery store, we are told that, 
of the Innsmouth people, “… it was generally only rather young people who were seen about 
in public, and of these the oldest were apt to be the most tainted-looking. […] One wondered 




strange and insidious disease-phenomenon which increased its hold as years advanced” (518). 
Here, the “strangeness” of the people of Innsmouth is explained as the consequence of a 
degenerative disease, and their difference is evaluated negatively by the use of the word 
“tainted.” The narration continues to refer to the “Innsmouth look” as an “affliction” and a 
“malady.” 
It should be noted that in all these instances, the narrator is constantly unsure of 
whether the “Innsmouth look” is indeed a case of disease or a racialized “blood strain” of 
“foreign” heritage in the New England town. The following passage shows him 
contemplating the alternative explanations side by side: 
 
For one thing, the people were more hideous and abnormal than those near the centre 
of the town […] Undoubtedly the alien strain in the Innsmouth folk was stronger here 
than farther inland – unless, indeed, the “Innsmouth look” were a disease rather than a 
blood strain, in which case this district might be held to harbour the more advanced 
cases. (521)  
 
In this passage, the narrator calls the people of Innsmouth “hideous and abnormal”, attributing 
their hideousness and abnormality either to an “alien strain” (from the “queer ports in Africa, 
Asia, the South Seas,” 507) or alternatively a slowly progressing degenerative disease. The 
repeated juxtaposition of these qualities – of disease and non-white heritage – arguably 
equates them in the story, especially when both are given as possible explanations for why the 
people are “hideous” and “abnormal”. In this passage, then, “normal” is subtly marked as 
both “healthy” and “white European”. 
We are approaching the point where SoI reveals itself as a deeply racist story.  While 
the narrator is at this point uncertain of what has caused the “degeneration” of Innsmouth, 
both in the social and medical sense, the audience will eventually learn that it is caused by the 
fact that the town’s human inhabitants have interbred with the Deep Ones and produced 
hybrid offspring, who are marked by the “Innsmouth look”. There is, therefore, a very literal 
non-human “alien strain” in the people of Innsmouth, but as I will show in the next section, 
simultaneously the monstrous people of Innsmouth are in many ways discursively linked to 







2.3.4. Explicit and implicit racialization 
 
This section analyzes the ways that the monstrous Innsmouth people are racialized in the 
narration. The process starts with the travel agent’s lengthy exposition of Innsmouth and the 
popular dislike against it and its inhabitants, which the travel agent attributes to “simply race 
prejudice” (507), directed at a “foreign” strain in the population of Innsmouth:  
 
… what a lot of our New England ships used to have to do with queer ports in Africa, 
Asia, the South Seas, and everywhere else, and what queer kinds of people they 
sometimes brought back with ‘em. […] Well, there must be something like that back 
of the Innsmouth people. […] There certainly is a strange kind of streak in the 
Innsmouth folks today – I don’t know how to explain it, but it sort of makes you 
crawl. (507)  
 
In this quote, we can already see that foreignness is regarded as something disgusting or 
disconcerting. Furthermore, as will become apparent in this section, foreignness is here 
functionally equal to non-whiteness and not simply being from a different country than the 
United States.  
The narrator takes the suggestion of “foreign blood” as his working hypothesis when 
he starts to investigate Innsmouth, as shows in his inspection and description of Joe Sargent, 
the first person with the “Innsmouth look” that he encounters: “Just what foreign blood was in 
him I could not even guess. His oddities certainly did not look Asiatic, Polynesian, Levantine, 
or negroid, yet I could see why the people found him alien. I myself would have thought of 
biological degeneration rather than alienage” (513). While he is unable to pinpoint the 
“source” of Joe Sargent’s otherness and tends toward the explanation of disease (“biological 
degeneration”), the passage shows a few interesting things. First, the narrator is clearly 
thinking in terms of putative biological human races (a now discredited notion), as he inspects 
Joe Sargent and tries to find physical signifiers of a non-white “race.” The vocabulary that he 
uses while doing so reveals that he is clearly thinking in terms of quasi-biological “race” 
rather than, say, country of origin. Secondly, there is a very clear line being drawn at what is 
considered an “oddity” and “alien” versus what is “normal” and “familiar”: it is presumed 
non-white heritage that is marked as a source of “oddity” and “alienage”, which in turn marks 




A third observation that can be made from this very telling passage is the juxtaposition 
of “foreignness” or “alienage” (read: non-whiteness) and an unspecified disease as alternative 
explanations for the mystery and decline of Innsmouth, as noted earlier. This occurs several 
times, with the narrator unsure of which cause to attribute the town’s degeneration to. A 
possible effect of this repeated juxtaposition is that the value judgments and connotations of 
either attribute bleed into the other: and so the negative connotations attached to disease also 
become attached to non-whiteness. 
It would be easy to discount this argument on the basis that, as we learn later in the 
story, the “strangeness” of Innsmouth is caused by the town’s (assumedly white) human 
population interbreeding with non-human creatures rather than non-white humans. Following 
this line of thinking, the initial attribution of the townspeople’s “aberrant” appearance and the 
town’s decline to “foreign blood” being introduced to the previously white town, as the ticket 
agent does, is a mere narrative misdirection that is supplanted by the revelation that the 
“foreign strain” of Innsmouth is in fact nonhuman rather than non-white. However, the 
racialization and the presentation of “foreignness” as an integral part of the monsters’ alterity 
do not end here. The Innsmouth monsters, during the narrator’s escape from the town, are at 
times described in terms that closely resemble racist stereotypes of Black people, as in this 
excerpt: “[I] was horrified by the bestial abnormality of their faces and the dog-like sub-
humanness of their crouching gait. One man moved in a positively simian way, with long 
arms frequently touching the ground…” (545). The idea of “sub-humanness”, of course, is 
one with very racist implications as well, and the description of one man’s (note that the 
narrator, at this point, still sees the monsters as fundamentally human) movements as 
“simian” and with “long arms frequently touching the ground” is an image which, while here 
not explicitly attached to a Black person, still carries the racist connotations (see Loponen 
2019, 65 for similar racist stereotypes in fantasy fiction). A similar description of “dirty, 
simian-visaged children” (515) occurs early on in the story, as the narrator describes the 
general decay of Innsmouth.  
It should also not escape our notice that while the degeneration, ultimately, is not 
technically caused by the town’s white inhabitants “mixing” with people of color, the 
introduction of Deep Ones to the people of Innsmouth happens in connection with Obed 
Marsh’s voyage to the Pacific Islands. In other words, it is still a threat from outside white 
New England, from a racialized location, that causes the corruption and decline of the town 





When discussing how SoI constructs “foreignness” as frightening, it is instructive to 
look at how the narrator treats the Innsmouth people’s speech. The narrator repeatedly draws 
attention to the speech of the Innsmouth people, its sound and particularly its language: “… 
the passengers […] shambled to the sidewalk and exchanged some faint guttural words with a 
loafer in a language I could have sworn was not English” (534). The word “guttural” comes 
up several times when the narrator describes the Innsmouth people’s speech, as does the 
mention that they are not speaking English. Both notions are presented as frightening or 
disgusting, as when the narrator describes Joe Sargent as speaking in “a throaty voice of 
peculiar repulsiveness” (534). “Guttural” or “throaty” sounds are uncommon in the English 
language, and native speakers of American English tend to evaluate “guttural” accents (such 
as Russian speakers of ESL) negatively (Lindemann 2005). We can infer that the probable 
effect of describing the speech of Innsmouth people as “guttural” is dual: the description 
makes the reader evaluate the Innsmouth hybrids’ speech both as “foreign” and “unpleasant”. 
The notion of the monsters not speaking English is repeated with more certainty later 
in the story during the narrator’s escape from Innsmouth, when he hears the monsters 
speaking in “horrible croaking voices exchanging low cries in what was certainly not 
English” (541). We should note that this is in some way justified as a source of disquiet to the 
narrator, as it is noted early on in the story that “foreigners seldom settled [in Innsmouth]” 
(509), and therefore hearing a non-English language in the town can be considered strange. 
However, combined with the other ways the creatures’ speech is described in the story, the 
notion of non-English language as frightening cannot be seen as an innocent choice in the 
story.  
Besides the Innsmouth creatures’ speech being described as “not English,” it is also 
said to be non-human, as in this excerpt when the narrator is accosted in the hotel: “A moment 
later I felt less sure that the deeper sounds were voices, since the apparent hoarse barking and 
loose-syllabled croakings bore so little resemblance to recognised human speech” (537). As 
with the observation that the monsters’ speech does not sound like English, the narrator’s 
certainty of the non-humanity of their speech increases as the story progresses to his escape 
from the town: “… the noises swelled to a bestial babel of croaking, baying, and barking 
without the least suggestion of human speech” (547). Before, he was unsure; now he 
describes their “noises” as “without the least suggestion of human speech,” as the non-
humanity of the creatures is finally established. It is noteworthy that the narrator’s certainty of 
his identification of the creatures’ language as non-English increases in a similar way as his 




juxtaposition of disease and non-white heritage as causes of Innsmouth’s degeneration, here, 
too, non-English language and nonhuman noises are presented side by side for the reader, and 
implicitly equaled with each other. 
The monsters’ speech is also explicitly frightening aside from the assumed physical 
threat that they pose, as can be seen in this quote: “But even in this acute moment my chief 
horror was something apart from the immediate weakness of my defences. I was shuddering 
because not one of my pursuers, despite some hideous pantings, gruntings, and subdued 
barkings at odd intervals, was uttering an unmuffled or intelligible vocal sound” (539). The 
narrator’s “chief horror” is not that he feels physically threatened but that he is not able to 
understand the monsters’ speech: unintelligible speech that does not sound how the narrator 
expects human speech to sound is represented as frightening.  
To reiterate the analysis so far: the Innsmouth monsters’ speech is presented in turns 
as “not English,” unintelligible, frightening and non-human. A curious boundary emerges in 
these representations: one where “foreign” (non-English) speech is not only unintelligible but 
also frightening (or outright terrifying and “hateful”) and even non-human. It is noteworthy 
that the narrator does not progress during the story from the recognition of the speech as “not 
English” to recognizing it as “not human,” but instead these notions are carried in the text side 
by side. English functions in the text as a signifier for “humanity,” or at least the local New 
England humanity. 
The very last description of the monsters’ speech occurs when the narrator witnesses 
the creatures’ moonlight procession and describes their voices as “clearly used for articulate 
speech” (549). During the course of the story, the narrator has subtly grown from first 
recognizing the monsters’ speech as tentatively “not English” and having “little resemblance 
to recognised human speech” to then seeing it as certainly non-English and non-human and a 
fully unintelligible “bestial babel,” to finally recognizing it as expressive “articulate speech,” 
albeit not in any language he knows. There is a subtle change in how he perceives the 
monsters that is most visible through how he perceives and describes their speech: from an 
initial impression of the creatures as “aberrant” humans, then racialized and dehumanized 
“subhumans”, and finally the recognition of them as a fully non-human, entirely distinct 
species with a distinct means of communication. The creatures pass, in the narrator’s 
perception of them, from human to non-human through a racialized conceptual space that 
stands between non-human and (implicitly: white) fully human. In other words, the narration 





Let us now tie together the various threads of monstrosity that I have analyzed in this 
chapter. As I have shown, the monsters of Innsmouth are racialized in various ways in the 
story and subtly presented as originating from outside (white) New England or white 
America. Furthermore, their interbreeding with the (implicitly white, as e.g. Joe Sargent’s 
description shows) human population of Innsmouth is presented as causing both biological 
and “civic” degeneration, which the narrator presents as a thing to be horrified and disgusted 
by. Given all this, it is very hard not to read the plot of The Shadow over Innsmouth as a 
metaphor for the perceived danger of miscegenation (the “mixing” of putative human “races”) 
and its supposed deleterious or degenerative effects on society. 
The construction of the monsters of SoI as simultaneously racialized, dehumanized, 
degenerate and non-human also shows how SoI draws the perimeter around humanity: 
humanity is marked as white, and the miscegenation of white people and people of color 
causes the degeneration of a previously white society. (Remember Pick’s observation that in 
the history of the idea of degeneration, non-white “races” were thought of as degenerate in 
comparison to the white “race” (Pick 1989, 21).) In SoI, the line separating humans from non-
humans is implicitly drawn in order to exclude people of color from full humanity, if not 
humanity altogether. 
 
2.4. The narrator’s monstrous transformation 
 
In section 2.2.2., I mentioned that the narrator does not stay a “positive human” until the end 
of the story. This is because at the end of the story he learns, through multiple sources, that he 
himself is descended from the Deep Ones and gradually undergoes a transformation similar to 
the people of Innsmouth, losing his humanity in the process.  
The claim of the narrator’s transformation must be accompanied by the qualification 
that the narration is somewhat ambiguous, leaving room for two different interpretations. 
Either the narrator truly undergoes the transformation, or else he is going insane after his 
traumatic experiences and hallucinating that he is transforming into an Innsmouth hybrid. To 
some degree, the narration seems to imply that the explanation for the changes as insane 
hallucinations is mere desperate denial from the narrator, who does not wish to accept the 
“hideous truth.” Notably, the narrator keeps his rational tone and capability of precise 





It was then that I began to study the mirror with mounting alarm. The slow ravages of 
disease are not pleasant to watch but in my case there was something subtler and more 
puzzling in the background. My father seemed to notice it, too, for he began looking at 
me curiously and almost affrightedly. What was taking place in me? Could it be that I 
was coming to resemble my grandmother and Uncle Douglas? (553)  
 
By the reference to his grandmother and uncle, the narrator means two of his relatives who he 
knows to have shown traces of “the Innsmouth look”. The narrator undergoes one of two 
possible transformations: either he physically transforms into an Innsmouth hybrid and loses 
his humanity, or he experiences a less literal transformation into a non-rational madman and 
therefore loses his rational Enlightenment humanity (Nayar 2013, 23, 138). Either 
transformation results, one way or another, in the loss of his Enlightenment humanity. The 
fact that the narrator seems to retain his rational cognitive state fairly long into the 
transformation implies that his transformation is primarily physical (resulting in an eventual 
change of mental state, as noted below) rather than psychological. For the purposes of my 
analysis, it is not very significant even if the transformation ends up being caused by madness 
and hallucination rather than biological predestination, as either case results in the loss of the 
narrator’s Enlightenment humanity. Likewise, in either case, the transformation is caused by 
the Enlightenment human being “contaminated” by the monstrous, either by biological 
descent or by infectious encounter.  
Whether caused by biology or by madness, the narrator’s transformation is 
accompanied by a notable change of his emotions towards the monstrous. What previously 
aroused horror, culminating in the narrator’s fainting when he witnesses the full extent of the 
alterity of the Innsmouth monsters, becomes a source of lyrical ecstasy. “The tense extremes 
of horror are lessening, and I feel queerly drawn toward the unknown sea-deeps instead of 
fearing them. I hear and do strange things in sleep, and awake with a kind of exaltation 
instead of terror” (553). This change in emotion marks the moment when the narrator loses 
his Enlightenment humanity: he no longer fears the monstrous Other or seeks to separate 
himself from it, but embraces it joyfully and decisively, planning to unite with his cousin, 
who is also hinted to have “the Innsmouth look”: “I shall plan my cousin’s escape from that 
Canton madhouse, and together we shall go to marvel-shadowed Innsmouth” (554). 
 The change in tone in this final paragraph is outright jarring compared to only two 
pages earlier, where “the Innsmouth shadow (…) had so darkly coloured my imagination” 




Enlightenment humanity (Carlin and Allen 2013, 83) – although the exact effect on the reader 
probably varies. Recall here Carroll’s notion that in art-horror, the emotions of positive 
humans instruct the audience in how to react to the story. At the end of SoI, that positive 
humanity disappears as the narrator transforms and his emotions cease to be a reliable 
indicator of how the audience should react – the audience is left to fend for itself, emotion-
wise. 
The final sentence of the story reads: “We shall swim out to that brooding reef in the 
sea and dive down through black abysses to Cyclopean and many columned Y’ha-nthlei, and 
in that lair of the Deep Ones we shall dwell amidst wonder and glory for ever” (554). The 
tone of the narration and the narrator’s attitude to the Deep Ones are entirely changed. Gone 
are the fearful descriptions of “monstrosity,” “blasphemousness,” and “abnormality” that 
earlier accompanied these creatures: these are replaced by awe and elation. Whether by 
madness or physical transformation, the narrator has lost his fearful Enlightenment human 




In this chapter, I have analyzed the construction of humanity in The Shadow over Innsmouth 
and compared the humanity constructed in the story to Enlightenment humanity. The narrator 
of the story is a rational Enlightenment “man,” whose rationality however fails upon contact 
with the monstrous Innsmouth hybrids. By constructing a rational Enlightenment humanist 
narrator and having his rationality fail upon contact with monstrous alterity, the story – 
perhaps unintentionally – reveals the limits of the capability of Enlightenment humanism to 
face alterity. 
Perhaps the most interesting, and the most ethically problematic, aspect of the story’s 
construction of humanity is its racialization of the monstrous Innsmouth hybrids. The 
Innsmouth hybrids are described in terms that resemble racist stereotypes of African 
Americans, and they are also discursively cast as foreign to white, English-speaking America. 
Parallel to this run discourses of degeneration and normality/abnormality that are closely 
linked to the racism of the story. The monstrous hybrids of Innsmouth act as an allegorical 
warning tale against miscegenation: the racialized hybrid monsters are a terrifying result of 
white Americans interbreeding with alien creatures from “outside.” In this, the monsters 




the 1930s: as Cohen (1996) notes, monsters are frequently employed in culture to enforce the 
prohibition of miscegenation (Cohen 1996, 15-16). 
It should be noted that this interpretation of SoI as a metaphor for the perceived 
dangers of miscegenation is not new: e.g. S. T. Joshi (2001, 305-306) has written on it 
previously. However, I have not found previous analyses of SoI’s miscegenation allegory in 
terms of the story’s general conception of humanity anywhere. In implicitly casting whiteness 
as a “normal” state of humanity that is disturbed by the intrusion of “abnormal” foreign 
elements, SoI constructs a conceptual category of humanity that excludes people of color: in 
SoI, only white people get to be fully human. This is sadly consistent with the observation that 
Enlightenment humanism has, despite its claims of egalitarianism, tended to exclude people 





3. Analysis of At the Mountains of Madness 
 
The analysis in this chapter focuses on how the category of ‘human’ is constructed in MM. I 
will again analyze the human characters (predominantly the narrator) from the viewpoint of 
Enlightenment humanity, as well as the monsters that function as devices for the construction 
of the human/nonhuman border. I will introduce some comparisons with my analysis of SoI, 
although I leave more detailed comparisons to the Conclusion of this thesis. The analysis will 
also compare the human, quasi-human and monstrous characters of the story, and highlight 




At the Mountains of Madness (henceforth abbreviated MM) recounts the experiences and 
findings of a fictional Antarctic expedition that takes place in 1930-1931. What begins as a 
geological and paleontological investigation turns strange as excavations performed by the 
group’s biologist, Lake, reveal perfectly-preserved fossils of previously unknown creatures 
that challenge accepted scientific knowledge. The narrator of the story learns of this via radio, 
as the expedition has split into two groups. The following night, the group of scientists that 
discovered the fossils are gruesomely killed and the bodies maimed. 
Shocked by the murders of his fellow scientists, the narrator of the story, along with 
his assistant Danforth, goes on an airplane expedition over a mystifying mountain range that 
the late group of scientists discovered before their deaths. Beyond the mountains, they find a 
deserted city that they understand to have belonged to alien creatures called the Old Ones that 
ruled the Earth forty million years ago, and they come to understand that the “fossils” that 
Lake’s group found and studied were, in fact, Old Ones in a state of hibernation. In the city, 
they find evidence of the Old Ones’ bygone civilization and the destruction of that 
civilization, which leads the narrator to identify the Old Ones with humanity, calling them 
“the men of another age” (495). They also discover that all life on Earth, including the human 
species, was once created by the Old Ones: in this, the Old Ones replace humans as the 
dominant species of the planet. The scientists are forced to end their investigation as they 
encounter a terrifying monster called a Shoggoth, which forces the scientists to escape the 
city. The narrator tells the story of the expedition only unwillingly, in order to warn another 






3.2. The human narrator 
 
This section focuses on the narrator of MM, who, like the narrator of SoI, is what Carroll 
(1990) calls a ‘positive human’ – even more so than the narrator of SoI, whose humanity is 
challenged by the end of the story. The narrator of MM is a scientist and firmly associated 
with the scientific rationality that is central to Enlightenment “Man”. The narrator retains a 
mostly rational tone and a rational method of acquiring information throughout the story, with 
one exception, which we will discuss later: it occurs when the narrator encounters the 
Shoggoth. (The scientists, however, also resort to mythical explanations for any inexplicable 
things they find, which could be said to constitute a breach of scientific rationality: I will 
discuss this below.) 
There are two ways in which the narration works to establish the narrator, a geologist 
participating in the scientific expedition, as having the thought process of a rationalist 
scientist. First, the narration is littered with very exact information concerning the times and 
locations of events and discoveries: even the location of the titular mountains is given with 
exact geographical coordinates (“Probable Latitude 76° 15’, Longitude 113° 10’ E ,” (431)). 
The biologist Lake’s messages describing the hibernating Old Ones that he has discovered are 
time-stamped, and the narrator keeps precise track of the dates of the events in the story. The 
narration strives to give the impression of a scientific report, with precise and objective 
information that could at least theoretically be fact-checked and verified within the fictitious 
universe. 
It should be noted that this preoccupation with reporting precise times all but 
disappears as the narrator and Danforth enter the dead city beyond the titular mountains. 
While this is partially because the start and end times of that expedition are reported, and the 
journey happens within the span of only sixteen hours (448), the change in the tone of the 
narration is noticeable. It is as if in this “monstrous” and “aeon-dead” (464) city, human time 
and the precision of time demanded by a modern, scientific society lose their meaning, giving 
this section of the story a timeless, dreamlike quality (on modern time schema, see e.g. Hunt 
2008, 25). In the presence of monstrosity and in touch with deep time – a recurring theme in 
Lovecraft’s fiction (see Carlin and Allen 2013, 74) – mere human time appears to become 
meaningless. 
The second way in which the narrator is constructed as “thinking scientifically” is the 




very recent and cutting-edge in 1931, when MM was written. These include several vague 
references to quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity as well as a mention of the 
discovery of Pluto,1 which happened in 1930 (Leonard 1930). A particularly prescient 
reference concerns “the theories of continental drift lately advanced by Taylor, Wegener, and 
Joly” (472), first proposed by Wegener in 1912 but only accepted by the scientific community 
in the 1960s as plate tectonics (Oreskes 1999, 9). A less lucky example is a reference to 
“planetary ether” (474), a theory concerning the substance with which some nineteenth-
century physicists proposed that space is filled. The theory had already been made obsolete by 
Einstein’s theory of relativity by 1931, but for some unknown reason, Lovecraft continued to 
believe in it (Joshi 1990a, 19). Aside from the mishap with ether, the story’s genre approaches 
“hard” sci-fi (Roberts 2006, 15), giving an impression that the story is solidly tied to then-
contemporary real-world science: the story creates an illusion of happening in the “real” 
world, rather than in an imaginary, fantastic one.  
Why is the narration so eager to construct the narrator as a rationalist scientist and to 
give the impression that the story is happening in the “real” world? There is a heightened 
concern in the story, expressed most powerfully in the beginning, that what the narrator has to 
tell will not be believed: “Doubt of the real facts, as I must reveal them, is inevitable; yet if I 
suppressed what will seem extravagant and incredible there would be nothing left” (422). The 
narrator is worried that even the photographic proof he has of his discoveries beyond “the 
mountains of madness” (449) will be considered forged: “The hitherto withheld photographs, 
both ordinary and aerial, will count in my favour, for they are damnably vivid and graphic. 
Still, they will be doubted because of the great lengths to which clever fakery can be carried. 
The ink drawings, of course, will be jeered at as obvious impostures…” (422). 
The narrator is so convinced of the scientific skepticism of his fictional audience that 
he can conceive of no proof that would convince them: photographs can be forged, and ink 
drawings will be seen as obvious fiction. The narrator, then, is left with only his word as the 
assurance that he is speaking the truth, and the acceptance of his report becomes a matter of 
whether he will be believed. This is a moment where one of the pillars of Enlightenment 
humanism is stealthily deconstructed: scientific knowledge becomes a matter of belief, not 
undeniable truth. The deconstruction goes even deeper in this paragraph: 
 
 
1 The mention of Pluto is absent from the version of the story printed in Necronomicon, but present in the online 




In the end I must rely on the judgment and standing of the few scientific leaders who 
have, on the one hand, sufficient independence of thought to weigh my data on its own 
hideously convincing merits or in the light of certain primordial and highly baffling 
myth cycles; and on the other hand, sufficient influence to deter the exploring world in 
general from any rash and over ambitious programme in the region of those mountains 
of madness. It is an unfortunate fact that relatively obscure men like myself and my 
associates, connected only with a small university, have little chance of making an 
impression where matters of a wildly bizarre or highly controversial nature are 
concerned. (422) 
 
This paragraph is taken from the beginning of the story, where the narrator talks of the 
necessity of convincing other scientists against further Antarctic exploration, and the 
difficulty in doing so due to the incredibility of his report. Here, the narrator is not putting his 
hopes of succeeding in the persuasiveness of his data but that scientific leaders will have 
“sufficient independence of thought” to “weigh [his] data on its own […] merits” – in other 
words, without the consideration that it comes from researchers of little standing and 
representing only a “small university”. On the other hand, he hopes that the rest of the 
scientific world will be convinced by the word of these “scientific leaders” of high status.  
The most noteworthy thing about this passage is that what is accepted as scientific 
truth becomes not only a matter of belief, but a matter of who is believed: those of high 
standing in the community of scientists. The ideal of science as the open-minded weighing of 
evidence is corrupted by status contests within the scientific community: the narrator places 
his hope of success in that a) the scientific leaders will deem his data trustworthy and b) the 
influence of the scientific leaders can prevent further explorations, whereas the narrator’s own 
influence cannot. Rather than being objective and based on evidence, what is accepted as 
scientific truth becomes a matter of the status of the person presenting the evidence.  
All this considered, the painstaking construction of the narrator as a rationalist 
scientist appears to be a strategy for assuring his narratees of the truthfulness of his report. 
Lacking objective data that would convince the narratee, the narrator has to resort to 
constructing an identity as a rational, objective, trustworthy scientist, the epitome of the 
Enlightenment “man”. While the narration superficially appears to deconstruct Enlightenment 
humanism – and, in a sense, it does, as it deconstructs the ideals of scientific truth – it 
simultaneously constructs and affirms it in the identity of its narrator. Scientific 




As noted earlier, there is a way in the story in which the scientists’ rationality could be 
said to fail when encountering inexplicable creatures. This is the scientists’ use of myths as 
explanations for inexplicable discoveries. This happens from the very beginning of the story, 
in the previous quote, where the narrator considers the possibility of the “scientific leaders” 
weighing his work “in the light of certain primordial and highly baffling myth-cycles” (422), 
and it is present in Lake’s description of the Old Ones he discovers: 
 
 Complete specimens have such uncanny resemblance to certain creatures of primal 
myth that suggestion of ancient existence outside antarctic becomes inevitable. Dyer 
and Pabodie have read Necronomicon and seen Clark Ashton Smith’s nightmare 
paintings based on text, and will understand when I speak of Elder Things supposed to 
have created all earth life as jest or mistake. (438-9)  
 
Natural scientists raising “primal myths”2 as even vaguely convincing explanations for their 
findings in this way is quite unscientific, irrational and borderline ridiculous: and yet the 
supposedly utterly rational Enlightenment scientists of MM do so here. This reliance on 
mythical explanations when faced with that which scientific models fail to explain (such as 
the Old Ones, which Lake fails to classify as either plant or animal) can perhaps be called a 
lapse of rationality, although it is not nearly as dramatic as the narrator’s switch between 
epistemological modes in SoI when he encounters the Innsmouth hybrids. The latter affects 
the narrator’s entire cognition, unlike the MM’s scientists’ reliance on the realm of myth and 
art where science fails.  
The reason for this difference between the narrators of SoI and MM is not explicated 
in the text. One could think that MM’s less pronounced failure of rationality upon encounter 
with the monstrous is because the characters do not actually ever meet living Old Ones in the 
flesh (those that do, do not survive the encounter). In SoI, the narrator physically meets the 
Innsmouth hybrids, which prompts a more dramatic change in his cognition. (Note that the 
physical encounter with the Shoggoth near the end of MM prompts a cognitive switch similar 
to SoI, as we will see later.) The SoI narrator’s greater failure at being a rational human could 
also be due to his own contested humanity: he carries non-humanity within his own body, 
although this does not become apparent until the end of the story. 
 
2 Incidentally, the myths mentioned refer to parts of Lovecraft’s mythos that have been introduced in his other 





3.3. The Old Ones 
 
In this section, I introduce the first of the monsters that the narrator of MM encounters: the 
Old Ones.  The researchers’ first encounter with these creatures occurs when one of the 
expedition groups finds a cave full of fossils thirty million years old or older, including 
several damaged and several perfectly intact “specimens” (437) that are unlike anything 
known to science. “Dark grey, flexible, and infinitely tough” (437), eight feet long and barrel-
shaped, with “flexible arms or tentacles”, wings and five-pointed, starfish-shaped heads, the 
things confound the scientists thoroughly. The biologist of the expedition inspects and 
dissects one specimen but fails to “assign [them] positively to animal or vegetable kingdom” 
(438), as they exhibit features of both categories. In other words, the creatures are hybrid and 
challenge the categories that the scientists (and by extension, humans) use to make sense of 
the world: signs of monstrosity. 
However, it is noteworthy that the feelings of fear and disgust, the marks of a horror 
monster according to Carroll (1990), are absent in the scientists’ initial interaction with the 
creatures. Rather, the things initially inspire wonder and puzzlement with their extreme age, 
perfect preservation, hybridity and highly developed and unknown structure. The only cause 
of disgust is the “pungent and offensive odour” (440) of the fluid they ooze when cut, which 
maddens the expedition’s sledge-dogs. (The Innsmouth denizens in SoI also provoke intense 
dislike in animals.)  
The biologist Lake dissects one specimen, covers it with a tarpaulin, sends a final 
radio message to the narrator and the other members of the expedition, and decides to rest for 
the night. The following day, there is radio silence from Lake’s camp, and the worried 
narrator, accompanied by some other members of the expedition, flies to the camp to 
investigate. Upon arrival, they find the camp destroyed, the men and dogs gruesomely killed, 
the damaged “specimens” buried, and the undamaged ones missing without a trace. One man 
and one dog are also missing. The narrator draws our attention to how the slaughtered men 
and dogs have been not only killed, but mutilated: 
 
I have said that the bodies were frightfully mangled. Now I must add that some were 
incised and subtracted from in the most curious, cold-blooded, and inhuman fashion. It 
was the same with dogs and men. All the healthier, fatter bodies, quadrupedal and 




butcher; and around them was a strangle sprinkling of salt – taken from the ravaged 
provision chests on the planes – which conjured up the most horrible associations. 
(450) 
 
This scene is the first hint that the “human” category is going to be challenged during the 
course of the story, even though the significance of the scene is only going to become clear 
later. This is not merely a butchering, but a dissection, as the narrator notes a while later when 
he refers to the “human incision subjects” (450) and “carefully though oddly and inexpertly 
dissected parts of one man and one dog” (451). The humans, who earlier were dissecting the 
hibernating Old Ones, have now become the objects of dissection; and to add insult to injury, 
they are lumped in the same category with dogs in the process. And as the narrator will learn 
and reveal later, the dissection was carried out by the Old Ones who awakened to find out one 
of their kind cut apart by the humans; thus, the roles of human scientist and nonhuman 
dissection-subject are reversed. This reversal also dramatically changes the nature of scientific 
dissection: when done by the Old Ones on humans, it ironically becomes “inhuman” rather 
than an act of scientific curiosity, a lauded act of an Enlightenment human. 
The sprinkling of salt around the bodies of men and dogs is another subtle challenge to 
the humanity of the scientists. The image calls to mind the folklore practice, observed in 
several cultures, of sprinkling or pouring salt to ward against evil spirits or demons (Laszlo 
and Mader 2001, 149).3 In this, the humans are made into monsters that the Old Ones try to 
protect themselves from. In further irony, it also marks the Old Ones as creatures that, despite 
the narrator’s later claims of the Old Ones’ scientific thinking, cling to folklore and myth as 
their first explanation when facing the unknown. In this, they are not at all unlike the human 
scientists, who also resort to mythological explanations frequently. 
The third irony in this scene that hints at the coming challenge to humanity is the 
burial of the damaged Old Ones: some of them apparently died during their hibernation, and 
the narrator finds these “six imperfect monstrosities carefully buried upright in nine-foot snow 
graves under five-pointed mounds punched over with groups of dots” (447). This burial 
strikes him as “crazy” (451), very possibly because he assumes that the missing scientist or 
some other human did it, and he cannot understand why any human would give funeral rites 
to non-human “monstrosities” (454). Later the narrator and the reader can infer that the burial, 
 
3 Another possible interpretation is that the Old Ones used the salt to preserve the flesh cut from the bodies: the 




too, was carried out by the surviving Old Ones, who marked the graves with symbols that are 
meaningful for them. 
Next, the narrator and his companions carry out a burial of their own: “We buried the 
human parts beside the other ten men, and the canine parts with the other thirty-five dogs” 
(451). In burying the men and the dogs separately, they reaffirm the human-animal boundary, 
which has been momentarily disturbed by the indiscriminate dissection performed by the Old 
Ones. The symmetry of mutual dissection of the Other and respectful burial of one’s own kind 
is near-perfect, and it foreshadows the later identification of the Old Ones with humanity. The 
humans, without realizing it yet, carry out the exact same actions that the Old Ones carried 
out earlier – dissection and burial. 
Upon observing the horror at the camp, the narrator’s outlook on the Old Ones 
changes. Previously, he displayed no fear or disgust towards them, but now he refers to them 
as “those hellish Archaean organisms” and “nightmare specimens” (450). It appears that the 
arrival of horror to the narrative also triggers a change in the narrator’s attitude regarding the 
creatures: his emotions change into ones more typical for horror. 
This atmosphere of vague fear and a feeling of “monstrosity” continue to be present 
when the narrator and the graduate student Danforth investigate the deserted city of the Old 
Ones beyond the “mountains of madness.”  This is in spite of the fact that no physical danger 
is present, save for the encounter with the Shoggoth near the end of the story: it is primarily 
the sheer age (“appalling antiquity,” 466) of the city that appears to make it horrifying. As 
already noted in section 3.1., the narrator’s investigation of the city eventually leads him to 
identify the Old Ones with Enlightenment humanity. However, before we delve into the 
analysis of how that change of perception occurs and what it means, let us first look at the 
other species of monsters present in MM: the Shoggoths. This will give us more perspective 
on the significance of the Old Ones’ humanization. 
 
3.4. The Shoggoths 
 
In this section, I will analyze the second kind of monsters in MM, the Shoggoths. The narrator 
encounters a Shoggoth only very briefly near the end of the story in the deserted city of the 
Old Ones (although he learns of their existence earlier when studying the murals of the city). 
The encounter is a terror-filled one, as the Shoggoth chases the narrator and Danforth through 
an underground tunnel, and only by sheer luck the humans manage to lose their pursuer. This 




intuition in a manner similar to the narrator of SoI: “[The sight of the Shoggoth] crippled our 
consciousness so completely that I wonder we had the residual sense to dim our torches as 
planned, and to strike the right tunnel toward the dead city. Instinct alone must have carried us 
through – perhaps better than reason could have done…” (498). Similarly to the hotel scene in 
SoI where the narrator’s subconscious prepared him for escape, in this scene instinct briefly 
serves the human characters better than rationality when it comes to escaping an assault by a 
monster. 
This cognitive switch from rationality to irrational instinct is perhaps to be expected, 
as this is the only time in the story when the narrator encounters a true horror monster: the 
Old Ones, who are eventually identified with humanity, do not qualify as such. The 
Shoggoths, appearance-wise, have many monstrous qualities: they exude a disgusting smell 
and are formless, “shapeless entities composed of a viscous jelly which looked like an 
agglutination of bubbles” (473). Carroll notes that formlessness can function as a type of 
monstrous defiance to categorization, as a formless or endlessly shape-changing creature is 
impossible to pin down as a member of any category (Carroll 1990, 33). Shoggoths inspire 
the characteristic monstrous combination of fear and disgust: seeing a mere sculptured image 
of a Shoggoth “fill[s] Danforth and [the narrator] with horror and loathing” (473). They are 
black, iridescent and fifteen feet in diameter when spherical, but capable of taking on many 
forms and even transforming their protoplasm into “temporary limbs and organs” (473). This 
malleability is by design, as the Shoggoths are an artificial species created by the Old Ones as 
“ideal slaves” (469) to build and maintain the Old Ones’ civilization. 
Unlike the Old Ones, the Shoggoths remain firmly placed outside humanity 
throughout the story. Not only are they never identified with humanity as the Old Ones are, 
but their hideousness is partially outside the capability of human language to describe: “The 
words reaching the reader can never even suggest the awfulness of the sight [of the 
Shoggoth]” (498). The narration goes as far as to say that “Shoggoths and their work ought 
not to be seen by human beings or portrayed by any beings” (495) and to describe the glimpse 
of the Shoggoth in a somewhat self-aware manner as “the utter, objective embodiment of the 
fantastic novelist’s ‘thing that should not be’” (499). These creatures are something so 
antithetical to the narrator’s understanding of the world that his mind recoils from them in 
horror and denial: in other words, they embody absolute monstrosity. 
The narration’s treatment of Shoggoths is remarkably different from how its treatment 
of the Old Ones. As mentioned above, Shoggoths are a species created by the Old Ones for 




intelligence, the usual marker of an Enlightenment human, can humanize the Shoggoths to the 
narrator – on the contrary, it only adds to their horror. When studying the murals in the 
deserted city, the narrator learns that the Shoggoths, first created as mindless beasts of burden 
whom the Old Ones control by hypnotic suggestion, over time developed “a dangerous degree 
of accidental intelligence” (473). This leads to a “war of re-subjugation” waged upon the 
Shoggoths by the Old Ones, which the Old Ones win, and afterwards the Shoggoths are 
“tamed and broken” (473) and “kept in admirable control” (479) by the Old Ones. Note this: 
the admiration and sympathies of the narration are firmly on the side of the Old Ones, even 
when they keep enslaving the now-sentient Shoggoths. 
The Shoggoths’ intelligence is thus presented not as humanizing but as a threat to the 
civilization of the Old Ones: the Shoggoths’ developing intelligence leads to their rebellion 
against the Old Ones’ domination. What is more, the Shoggoths’ intelligence is presented as 
horrifying. The narrator previously observed the Old Ones’ artwork in the murals, sculptures 
and reliefs of the city: in the underground parts of the city he finds “new and degenerate 
[art]work” (492) by the  Shoggoths that crudely imitates the Old Ones’ style and which strikes 
him as disturbingly alien. The narrator’s perception of the Shoggoths’ creations is strikingly 
different from how he perceives the Old Ones’ art: the latter aroused feelings of admiration 
and aesthetic appreciation. Another aspect of this terrifying intelligence is the sounds that the 
Shoggoths make. They have “no voice save the imitated accents of their bygone masters” 
(499), and once they develop intelligence they are said to “converse with the Old Ones by 
mimicking their voices” (479). The Shoggoths are presented as capable of only imitation, not 
creation of their own, and this imitative intelligence consistently creates feelings of disgust 
and horror in the narrator. 
 
3.5. “They were men!” The humanization of the Old Ones and its problems 
 
In this section, I will discuss the humanization of the Old Ones by the narrator. The narration 
builds towards this climactic moment gradually, as the narrator and Danforth investigate the 
dead Antarctic city once inhabited by the Old Ones. They find artistic murals and statues and 
evidence of a highly developed civilization as well as technology surpassing that of humans. 
Having thus learned that the Old Ones had science, technology, a developed society and high 





… poor Lake, poor Gedney… and poor Old Ones! Scientists to the last – what had 
they done that we would not have done in their place? God what intelligence and 
persistence! What a facing of the incredible, just as those carven kinsmen and 
forebears had faced things only a little less incredible! Radiates, vegetables, 
monstrosities, star spawn – whatever they had been, they were men! (495) 
 
The first thing in this quote that we should note is, of course, the ascribing of humanity to the 
Old Ones: “they were men!” (“Men” here is a generic masculine for “humans,” although we 
should also note that MM is a story without a single mention of women.) This ascription of 
humanity happens on the basis of the Old Ones’ mental qualities (intelligence and 
persistence) in spite of their nonhuman biological bodies. This focus on mental qualities when 
assigning humanity is consistent with Enlightenment humanism, as noted in the Introduction. 
Furthermore, the narrator considers the Old Ones “scientists to the last,” implicitly assigning 
them the same place at the top of the hierarchy of Enlightenment humanity as he grants to 
human scientists. 
The second thing to be noted in this passage is the extension of sympathy to the Old 
Ones alongside humans. For context, this passage occurs right after the narrator finds Old 
Ones who have been gruesomely decapitated by Shoggoths in the tunnels of the deserted city. 
He assumes, with good reason, that these are the same individuals that were excavated by the 
scientists, woke from their hibernation to find one of their kind dissected, killed the scientists 
and the dogs, and escaped the camp to their city.  In saying “poor Lake, poor Gedney… and 
poor Old Ones!”, the narrator sets the dead Old Ones alongside his dead fellow scientists and 
extends his sympathy for these men to the Old Ones. The extension of humanity to the Old 
Ones is accompanied by the extension of sympathy to them, and the narrator is even willing 
to forgive them for the slaughter at the camp, as he sees it as done by a fellow human in self-
defense: “what had they done that we would not have done in their place?” 
However, despite this forgiveness, the danger that the Old Ones pose to humans does 
not appear to be completely dispelled. When stating the reason for telling his story in the first 
place, the narrator speaks of “unnamable and perhaps immeasurable evils” (453) that would 
arise if scientists continued to disturb the secrets of the Antarctic. It is unclear whether this 
refers to the Old Ones, the Shoggoths, or both, but the narrator’s thoughts betray that he does 
not quite believe the Old Ones to be kindly disposed to humanity. When the narrator and 
Danforth, investigating the tunnels of the dead city, believe themselves chased by an Old One 




however, that nonaggressive conduct and a display of kindred reason might cause such a 
being to spare us in case of capture, if only from scientific curiosity. After all, if such a one 
had nothing to fear for itself it would have no motive in harming us” (496). Firstly, the 
narrator has “a vague hope” that the Old One would not kill them: he is far from convinced. 
And even the qualifier “if only from scientific curiosity” rings hollow, if we remember that in 
Lake’s camp, the human scientists’ scientific curiosity led to dissection and subsequent 
revenge by the dissected. Of note in this passage is what the narrator imagines would prompt 
the Old One to save them: “display of kindred reason.” This is one of the strongest indicators 
that the story employs the concept of Enlightenment humanity: “reason” is named as the 
feature that supposedly connects humans and Old Ones into the same ontological category. 
In addition to possible physical threat, the Old Ones certainly form a cognitive threat 
to humanity. Besides the creation of Shoggoths, the Old Ones’ ability to create artificial life 
led to the accidental creation of all life on earth; or as the text puts it, they were “the makers 
and enslavers of that life” (467).  Note again the casual mention of enslavement without any 
problematization. It is important to note that the life that the Old Ones created also includes 
humans: “It interested us to see in some of the very last and most decadent sculptures a 
shambling, primitive mammal, used sometimes for food and sometimes as an amusing 
buffoon by the land dwellers, whose vaguely simian and human foreshadowings were 
unmistakable” (472). This quote pushes humanity from its pedestal as the center of the 
universe. S. T. Joshi calls it “probably one of the most fiercely cynical and misanthropic 
utterances ever made: the degradation of humanity can go no further” (Joshi 1990b, 197). The 
observation that the species Homo sapiens is degraded in this quote is obviously correct; 
however, we should note that Enlightenment humanity remains more or less intact in the Old 
Ones regardless of what happens to the humanity of Homo sapiens. Again we see 
Enlightenment humanity both deconstructed and upheld in the story. 
This replacement of humans by the Old Ones as the most advanced beings in existence 
is probably the chief threat that the Old Ones form to humanity, and a deeper cause of horror 
than the direct physical threat from the Shoggoth. The recognized humanity of the 
technologically and intellectually advanced Old Ones threatens the self-understanding of 
Enlightenment humans, and the simultaneous degrading of Homo sapiens works towards the 
same end.  
Having said this, the narration granting Enlightenment humanity to the Old Ones is far 
from unproblematic. We see this perhaps most clearly if we contrast the humanization of the 




inhumanity of the Shoggoths, which persists despite their developing intelligence. The fact 
that the Old Ones’ civilization is based on the Shoggoths’ slave labor is never problematized 
in the story, and, as seen earlier, the narration sympathizes with and even admires the Old 
Ones but never the Shoggoths. Not to put too fine a point on it, the narrative sympathy in MM 
remains with the slave-master the entire time, while the enslaved creatures arouse only 
feelings of horror and disgust. In other words, the narrative ascribes Enlightenment humanity 
and encourages sympathy for the slave-master but not the enslaved. 
It would be tempting, knowing Lovecraft’s infamous racism, to draw, from MM’s tacit 
acceptance of slavery and simultaneous exaltation of Enlightenment humanity in the Old 
Ones, a parallel to the enslavement of Black people in the U.S., which at the same time was 
established on Enlightenment principles (Outram 2013, 138-139).4 However, I would exercise 
caution while doing so, as there is little in the descriptions of Shoggoths that would warrant 
such a comparison – they are not described in terms of racial stereotypes, unlike e.g. the 
Innsmouth hybrids in SoI. (The Shoggoths are black in color, but then the Old Ones are dark 
grey: no neat parallels to be drawn there.) It is noteworthy that the “taming and breaking” of 
Shoggoths after their rebellion is described in terms of American frontier mythology: 
“Shoggoths were tamed and broken by armed Old Ones as the wild horses of the American 
west were tamed by cowboys” (473). This, too, no doubt entices the reader to look for other 
parallels in the history of the U.S. However, I think that reading “slaves” as inherently a 
metaphor for “Black people” is problematic in itself (and reading “slime monsters” as a 
metaphor for “Black people” on scant evidence even more so), which is a big part of the 
reason that I would avoid doing so in this case, when other narrative evidence for that reading 
is rather slim. Furthermore, there is plenty to criticize in MM’s sympathy for the slave-master 
even without drawing the specific parallel with the enslavement of Black people. However, I 
recognize that there is room for disagreement on this point. 
Another aspect of MM that has possible racist implications is the discourse of 
degeneration, discussed in Chapter 2, that is present in the construction of the Old Ones’ 
Enlightenment humanity. When investigating the city, the narrator says, regarding the art of 
the Old Ones: “The technique [of the murals in the city], we soon saw, was mature, 
accomplished, and aesthetically evolved to the highest degree of civilised mastery…” (465). 
Note how this quote implies rank-ordering of civilizations according to the “degree” of 
 
4 Indeed, some literary works have drawn such a parallel: see Elizabeth Bear’s short story Shoggoths in Bloom 





civilization that they have reached: this is reminiscent of the themes of Galtonian rank-
ordering and degeneration discussed in section 2.3.3. The narrator also observes that the Old 
Ones’ civilization decayed over time, referring to the later art-work as “decadent” (472) and 
to the Shoggoths’ imitations as “degenerate” (492). I discussed the connection between 
degeneration, Enlightenment and racism as well as other types of discrimination in Chapter 2; 
all of the implications that the term “degeneration” carries are also present in MM.  
The last problematic aspect of the Old Ones’ Enlightenment humanity that I wish to 
discuss is their place as the “masters and possessors of nature” (Gandhi 2019, 37). This 
passage is instructive of the Old Ones’ attitude to the life forms that they created: 
 
These vertebrates, as well as an infinity of other life forms — animal and vegetable, 
marine, terrestrial, and aerial — were the products of unguided evolution acting on life 
cells made by the Old Ones, but escaping beyond their radius of attention. They had 
been suffered to develop unchecked because they had not come in conflict with the 
dominant beings. Bothersome forms, of course, were mechanically exterminated. 
(472) 
 
In this passage, the narrator sees the Old Ones as the dominant species on Earth in their time, 
exercising complete control over its biosphere and exterminating “bothersome” species at 
will. The tone of the passage is mostly neutral, but the words “of course” are very revealing: 
the narrator sees it as perfectly natural that the human-aligned dominant species acts as the 
arbiter of which species gets to live and which does not. This, as well as the narrator’s 
admiration for the control that the Old Ones exert over the enslaved Shoggoths, suggests that 
this power structure is entirely natural to the narrator and his Enlightenment humanist view of 
the world. In his view (and by extension, in the Enlightenment humanity that the story 
constructs), the rule of Enlightenment humans over lesser beings and the exploitation of those 
beings seems to be perfectly justified and not in any way problematic. As discussed in the 
Introduction, Nayar (2013, 48) sees this anthropocentric hierarchy of life forms as one of the 
central ethical issues of Enlightenment humanism: and this hierarchy is on display completely 









In this chapter, I have analyzed the construction of humanity in At the Mountains of Madness 
and compared the humanity constructed in the story to Enlightenment humanity. The 
humanity in the story is constructed through the narrator and the other human characters, as 
well as the Old Ones, who are eventually identified with Enlightenment humanity based on 
their intelligence and due to being “scientists.”  
 The humanity constructed in the story is thus consistent with Enlightenment humanity. 
However, what is done with Enlightenment humanity in the story is not so simple, as it is both 
undermined and upheld. The Enlightenment humanity of humans is eroded when science as 
the producer of reliable knowledge is questioned, and it is even degraded when humans are 
revealed to be the creation of the Old Ones and described in less than flattering terms. 
However, Enlightenment humanity appears to remain intact in the Old Ones, who are 
humanized and valorized on the basis of their intelligence, science, and art. 
 Furthermore, a critical reading of the story reveals characteristics of its Enlightenment 
humanity that are ethically questionable: the scientist narrator does not seem to find any 
ethical issues in the fact that the Old Ones’ civilization is one constructed on the slave labor 
of Shoggoths, even after he learns that the Shoggoths have developed a degree of intelligence 
and rebelled against their masters. The narration allows humanity and sympathy for the Old 
Ones, but none to the Shoggoths, thus taking the side of the enslaver rather than the enslaved. 
The discourse of degeneration, discussed in detail in the previous chapter, is also present in 
MM, albeit less prominently. Finally, the humanization of the Old Ones reveals a very 
anthropocentric, hierarchical attitude to the natural world and other life forms: the narrator 
does not see any issues in the fact that the Old Ones once exerted complete control over the 
Earth’s biosphere, exterminating “bothersome” species at will. The story thus reveals its 
Enlightenment humanism to be hierarchical in that it sets its valorized Enlightenment human 
above all other lifeforms and sees it as natural that Enlightenment “Man” should rule over and 





4. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Humanity, and its construction through monstrous alterity, has been the unifying theme 
throughout this thesis. At the beginning of the thesis, I stated that I would show that while 
these texts take a disparaging view of humanity in general, they still construct a valorized 
version of Enlightenment humanity. In addition, I stated that the humanity constructed in The 
Shadow over Innsmouth and At the Mountains of Madness reveals itself as hierarchical and 
exclusionary, leaving some humans out of full humanity. 
There are common elements but also meaningful differences between the humanity 
constructed in SoI and MM, respectively. Both texts construct a version of scientific 
Enlightenment humanity in their narrators, and in both texts, the category of humanity is 
exclusionary in some fashion: but the exclusion takes slightly different forms in either text.  
The humanity constructed in SoI is, in one word, precarious. The narrator is a classic 
Enlightenment “Man,” but his rationality wavers as soon as he comes into contact with an 
Innsmouth hybrid, whose monstrous alterity is beyond the capability of Enlightenment 
rationality to understand. The humanity of the people of Innsmouth is contaminated and lost 
through interbreeding with the Deep Ones, and the narrator, who is descended from the 
Innsmouth hybrids, loses his own humanity at the end of the story. The question that SoI 
seems to ask is: how strong or worthy is humanity if it cannot survive contact with 
nonhumans? This qualifies as a disparagement of humanity, but we should note that the story 
also represents the loss of humanity as horrific, thus implying that the story sees humanity in 
general as a desirable state of being. This seems to be at odds with the assertion usually made 
of Lovecraft that his stories express “indifference” to humanity (Sederholm and Weinstock 
2016, 5).  SoI, in fact, pays a lot of attention to defining the “human” category, as can be seen 
in its hybrid monsters. Through the racialized Innsmouth hybrids, SoI constructs a 
transparently racist idea of humanity, revealing that its idea of “untainted” humanity is white 
humanity. Thus, SoI excludes people of color from the purview of humanity. 
MM’s construction of humanity is interesting in that the story both constructs and 
extols Enlightenment humanity in the Old Ones, and simultaneously disparages humanity in 
Homo sapiens by attributing an unflattering origin to the human species and making Old Ones 
the creators of that species. In this story, the Old Ones replace the human species as the 
dominant intelligent species on earth. However, the story’s attribution of Enlightenment 




very hierarchical. The narration admires the Enlightenment humanity of the Old Ones while 
finding no ethical issues with the fact that the Old Ones enslave another sentient species, the 
Shoggoths. Besides slavery, the narration gives tacit acceptance of the Old Ones’ exercise of 
complete control over other life forms and the extermination of species that become 
“bothersome.” The story replicates the ecologically destructive anthropocentrism of 
Enlightenment humanism that posthumanist writers have criticized. Both stories, therefore, 
show aspects of Enlightenment humanity that can be considered ethically problematic: despite 
the apparent universality of Enlightenment humanity, the concept has in practice tended to 
relegate people of color, women, and various minorities to not-quite-human status. 
Not everything that I have done in my analysis is new, but analysis of Lovecraft’s 
texts from the viewpoint of Enlightenment humanism has not, to my knowledge, been done 
before. In retrospect, I could have delved even deeper into the postcolonial and posthumanist 
criticism of Enlightenment humanism, since a more rigorous theoretical basis would have 
added depth to the analysis. My review of the Enlightenment in particular should be 
recognized as a rough sketch of a historically complex period, whose meanings and 
interpretations are contested (Outram 2013, 1-7).  
 It should also be recognized that my analysis only deals with two texts out of 
Lovecraft’s fairly large published production, and therefore its results are not necessarily 
generalizable. Therefore, one avenue for further research could be the analysis of other works 
from Lovecraft to see if their conception of the human is similar to the one constructed in 
these works. SoI’s discursive nexus of normality/abnormality, degeneration, racism and the 
construction of humanity, in particular, is a theoretically fascinating idea for further research 
that I would like to analyze in more detail: I believe occurrences of this bundle of discourses 
can be found outside of SoI in literature and culture. 
Studying Lovecraft’s fiction is not just a matter of historical interest, as his works 
continue to exert an influence on literature and culture to this day. Given that Lovecraft’s 
works are still read, reinterpreted and rewritten today, it is crucial that they are also 
understood; and to be understood, they must be studied. With my thesis, I hope to have shown 
that at least some of Lovecraft’s literary works contain racist and otherwise discriminatory 
ideas in how they conceive of humanity. Engagement with his fiction cannot take the 
viewpoint of “separating the art from the artist”, i.e. focusing on the texts only rather than the 
writer’s personal views, since the texts themselves contain a conception of humanity that is 




Enlightenment humanism’s usual corollary, that some humans are excluded from full 
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